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ElĘsegíti-e az ideiglenes migráció a szaktudás 
terjedését? A nyugat-európai munkatapasztalat 




Európában növekszik az ideiglenes vándorlás jelentĘsége. Egy fejlettebb és magasabb 
bérszínvonalú országban szerzett munkatapasztalat javíthatja egy ideiglenes migráns 
szaktudását. A külföldön szerzett emberi tĘkével, amelyet visszatértekor magával hoz a 
kibocsátó országba, elĘsegítheti a szaktudás nemzetközi terjedését és a kibocsátó ország 
felzárkózását. E tanulmány elsĘként szolgáltat tapasztalati eredményeket ezen hipotézis 
alátámasztására a 2003-as ifjúsági Eurobarometer keresztmetszeti adataira támaszkodva, 
kelet-nyugati megközelítésben. 
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Abstract: Temporary migration is of growing significance in Europe. Upon migration to a country 
with higher technological development that typically coincides with positive wage differentials, 
temporary migrants may upgrade their skills by learning on the job and subsequently import the newly 
acquired human capital to their source country, thus adding to international know-how diffusion and 
the catching up of the respective economy. This paper is the first to provide supportive evidence of 
this hypothesis in a cross-country East to West European perspective, using the 2003 Youth 
Eurobarometer dataset.  
JEL: J61, J31, O15 
Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, return migration, wage premium, skill diffusion 
                                                      
* This research has received financial support from the GDN-SEE network. I thank Jörg Breitung, Edward 
Christie, Vladimir Gligorov, Milena Jovicic, Iulia Traistaru, Danny Sriskandarajah, Robert Stehrer, Alessandra 
Venturini, Alan Winters, Guntram Wolff, and the participants of the GDN workshops in Vienna, July 2005 and 
May 2006, and in St Petersburg, January 2006, for discussion and advice. 
** The Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (wiiw) and Center for European Integration Studies 
(ZEI), University of Bonn. Address: wiiw, Oppolzergasse 6, A – 1010 Vienna. Email: iara@wiiw.ac.at . 
  11 Introduction 
Migration has become a highly debated issue both in sending and receiving countries. Typically, the 
former are less developed, while the latter are mature industrialised economies. Among these, most of 
the EU member states have adopted a restrictive regime towards immigration, even – albeit 
temporarily – against labour movement from the new EU members. Decreasing public support for 
immigration in many destination countries on the one hand, concerns of an exodus of the better skilled 
from source countries on the other, and, finally, growing migratory pressure created by individual 
desires are urgeing for a taxation of various immigration policy instruments. This paper contributes to 
this debate by providing evidence on the returns to working experience in Western Europe in Eastern 
European labour markets. The focus is hence on temporary or return migration of labour in an East to 
West European context, adopting a source country perspective.  
Empirical evidence shows that return migration has been a constitutive part of international 
migratory flows throughout the 20
th century (Constant and Massey, 2002). In Western Europe 
specifically, return migration from Central Europe has grown in size in the 1990s (International 
Organization for Migration 2005: 145). Nevertheless, only recently has academic interest in migration 
become dedicated to migrants’ possibilities of return. Existing work has been focused on the decision 
to re-migrate. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) were among the first to study determinants of return 
migration both theoretically and empirically. Extending the standard Roy model
1 framework of 
mobility decisions to allow for reversibility, they show that return migration accentuates the selectivity 
of international mobility: the permanent stayers in the host country are “the best of the best” or “the 
worst of the worst” in the presence of positive or negative selection respectively. Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp (2000) furthered analytical thinking on return migration by modelling the simultaneous 
choice of migration duration and after-return employment status. As concerns the economic 
performance of returning migrants in their original country, economic analysis has so far focused on 
entrepreneurial activities of the returning migrants. Among others, empirical work has documented the 
higher probability of self-employment among returning migrants relative to the non-migrating 
population. Also, it has been hypothesised that a foreign working experience may offer the opportunity 
to accumulate savings to the migrant that she would use to overcome capital constraints to 
entrepreneurship upon return.  
In a partial equilibrium perspective, post-return differential earnings of returning migrant 
workers may be significant to the migrant’s home economy. In this context, we argue that a work stay 
in a more advanced economy (as it is characteristic of economic migration) may equip the individual 
                                                      
1 Roy (1951) has provided a general framework for the study of self selection in labour mobility based on costs 
and benefits of the potential move. We will elaborate on the Roy model in more detail in section 2.  
  2with either advanced technological knowledge or specific cultural knowledge that is likely to 
contribute to the competitiveness of the firm employing her and thus receive differential rewards back 
in the home economy. In this sense, temporary migration may contribute to international knowledge 
diffusion and increased international economic integration (via tightening international ties).  
In spite of the significance of such potentials for knowledge diffusion, we know of no more 
than three studies of temporary migrants’ post-return earnings performance, each looking at a single 
country. Co, Gang, and Yun (1999) study differential earnings of Hungarian workers with recent 
foreign working experience, using pooled household panel data of 1993 and 1994. In a maximum 
likelihood estimation framework, they account for selection both into labour force participation and 
going abroad. Their analysis reveals positive returns to women’s foreign working experience from 
OECD countries, but no such returns for women who returned from non-OECD countries, and for 
men. They also find evidence for positive selection of working men into the foreign working 
experience and negative selection for women, respectively. Barrett and O’Connell (2001) investigate 
differential earnings of temporary migrants back to Ireland, using survey data of 1992 college 
graduates. Information in this survey on reasons for emigration and return allows them to distinguish 
among others between human capital investment oriented and consumption, i.e. adventure oriented 
temporary migration. Estimating OLS wage regressions, they find a wage premium for men returning 
from labour market-related moves of 15 per cent, but no premium either for women or for men back 
from consumption oriented stays abroad. Their attempt to account for selectivity into migration by the 
standard Heckman correction procedure does not provide significant results. Finally, de Coulon and 
Piracha (2003) study the wage premium of returning migrants to Albania with survey data of 1998. 
They provide maximum likelihood estimates of earnings functions for migrants and stayers 
respectively conditional on the decision to migrate. In addition, they look at the observed and 
counterfactual wage distributions for migrants and stayers, using semiparametric techniques. Their 
analysis provides evidence of negative selection among Albanian temporary migrants, and of 
significant differences in migrants’ and non-migrants’ earnings functions. In particular, according to 
their results, stayers are rather rewarded for education and age (experience), whereas migrants’ 
average remuneration rather draws upon better career positions and a higher self-employment 
premium.  
Our research provides evidence of the returns to working experience of young temporary 
migrants obtained in any of the countries of the EU-15 plus Norway, Switzerland or Iceland upon 
return to the 13 pre-2005 EU candidate countries, based on data from the 2003 Central and Eastern 
European Youth Eurobarometer. We contribute to the understanding of the labour market effects of 
temporary migration by providing the first cross-country study on premia to work experience abroad. 
This is an advantage for migration has proven to have strong country-specific characteristics that 
prohibit drawing general conclusions from single country studies (Krieger 2004: 71). The findings of 
the above studies on East to West European migration may be particularly nongeneric, for Co et al. 
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undergone substantial adjustments, while the migration patterns of Albania may be far from 
representative of Eastern European countries, in particular due to the scale of Albanian temporary 
migration involving around one third of the labour force, as well as negative selectivity (de Coulon 
and Piracha, 2003). With our broad coverage of source and destination countries, we are able account 
for country specific effects as far as cross-section data permit. We investigate the premium to return 
migration from Western Europe to young males from EU accession countries appyling the endogenous 
switching regression methodology that allows the consideration of selection effects both concerning 
the choice to work or not, and the choice to go abroad or not to do so. We find empirical evidence of 
characteristic differences in the earnings patterns of movers and stayers among the Eastern European 
young men and, specifically, the former to be able to claim by around 30 per cent higher earnings than 
the latter. Our results on selection effects in going or not going abroad, however, are ambiguous. 
Concerning the type of temporary work related stays in Western Europe covered by our data, 
we can, unfortunately, only speculate. Prior to EU accession, citizens of the future EU members were 
not allowed to assume legal work in the member states of the European Economic Area (EEA) except 
within specific arrangements. However, such arrangements offered a variety of facilities for temporary 
employment. In the 1990s, most EEA members have granted specific temporary work and training 
opportunities to EU accession countries’ nationals within bilateral labour agreements, among others 
with the purpose of enhancing labour mobility and economic integration (Bobeva and Garson, 2004). 
Such agreements covered seasonal employment (in areas with large temporary fluctuations of labour 
demand, such as agriculture, catering, and construction), project-based employment (via a work 
assignment to a company), guest worker schemes (offering skilled professional training opportunities), 
and traineeship and apprenticeship programmes respectively (see Bobeva and Garson, 2004, and 
OECD 2004, Annex 1a). For the case of Hungary, Hárs (2003) presents a unique evaluation of a 
dataset on individuals who participated in bilateral programmes with Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland in 2001. She finds that 40 per cent of the 1877 participants of traineeship, frontalier and 
seasonal worker schemes in these countries aged 24 and younger were trainees. Besides, she does not 
find support for the claim that the work performed by temporary migrants abroad is typically below 
their skill level or domestic work status. The relative importance of various bilateral work programmes 
varies by destination country.
2 Still, the above findings illustrate the availability of opportunities for 
skill enhancement available to young nationals of the EU accession countries in Western Europe. In 
addition to work schemes specified in bilateral agreements, legal opportunities for temporary work 
abroad are provided by sector-based work schemes that are not restricted to citizens of specific 
                                                      
2 E.g., Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2005) report that 76 per cent of Polish nationals working abroad in the late 
1990s were seasonal workers in Germany, while in Hárs’ sample of Hungarians in Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland, considerably less – 58 per cent – are seasonal workers. 
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specific sectors as well (e.g. for ICT workers in Germany). Assuming that temporary work abroad at 
higher qualification levels typically covers longer work stays unless it is part of a trainee programme, 
we consider it less likely that individuals aged 24 and less have participated in sector-based schemes 
for the higher skilled abroad. A further possibility to work abroad for that can rather be expected to 
provide for skill enhancement is the right granted to foreign students to assume work during their 
study abroad, as e.g. in the Netherlands and France (see OECD, 1998). Finally, Western European 
work related stays reported in our sample may relate to illegal labour. This type of activity can again 
be expected to have a rather low skill content. Based on these considerations, we conclude that in 2003 
various opportunities existed for young Eastern European citizens to assume work abroad. A major 
part of such opportunities appears less suited to provide for the acquisition or enhancement of specific 
or particularly high skills. Still, work experience abroad may have sufficiently enhanced the human 
capital of a returning migrant to obtain a higher wage back home. This is what we empirically 
investigate in the present analysis. Unfortunately, our data do not allow to differentiate our 
econometric assessment by destination countries and their policies towards temporary foreign 
employment. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the analytical framework 
and discuss the methodology adopted. In section 3, we describe the dataset and present summary 
statistics. Section 4 offers the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.  
2  Analytical and methodological framework 
2.1  Analytical framework 
We aim at empirically assessing the returns to working experience made in more developed countries 
by nationals of Eastern European countries. To this end we perform an endogenous switching 
regression analysis of standard wage equations accounting for individual and job characteristics as 
developed by Mincer.  
More formally, we assume that individuals work equal hours that are normalised to one so that 
their earnings from work equal the hourly wage, W. Workers are remunerated for their human capital 
that can be decomposed to the individual’s education, sector-specific knowledge, working experience, 
and an individual component that is observed to the employer but not to the researcher. Working 
experience specifically is valued for its training-on-the-job effect. Denoting working experience (i.e. 
training) by T, a vector of other variables (including a constant) by X, and the unobserved component 
by [, in a standard loglinear specification, individual wages are described by 
  5wi= Xi‘D+ Ti‘\ + Q‘[i    (1),   
where  w=log(W). The coefficients reflect how the employer valuates the human capital 
components of the individual. 
Human capital from on-the-job training can be acquired in the home country of the worker, H, 
or a foreign country, F. Country F is technologically more advanced. A worker from H who receives 
training abroad has the opportunity to learn about specific technologies. A potential employer in H 
may be particularly interested in hiring such a worker because her imported knowledge could add to 
the competitiveness of his firm. Therefore, the employer will remunerate working experience acquired 
in F higher than domestic experience. However, working expience from the foreign country may also 
be regarded less valuable than domestic experience, notably if country H lacks the conditions for the 
adaptation of the skills practiced in F, i.e. if production technologies are incompatibly different in the 
two countries. In addition to specific working experience, a work stay abroad may help the migrant 
develop further qualities J ithat are observable to, and appreciated by, the domestic employer but that 
are unobservable from standard survey data.
3 
With the above distinction between domestic and foreign working experience, the equation 











       (2),   
where \ and I  describe the valuation of domestic and foreign job-specific human capital 
acquired on the job respectively
4. For non-migrant workers, T i
F=0 and J i=0. 
Consider a worker equipped with certain human capital characteristics including working 
experience T0
H acquired in her native country in t=0. For the next period, the worker may or may not 
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H[i.          (3b) 
Work abroad is possible for one period only. In this period, migrant worker has acquired 
additional experience T1
F. If she remained in H, in the same period she would have acquired further 
domestic experience T1
H. In t=2, a returning migrant worker can expect a salary of  
w i 2
H,M







H[ i+Ji     (4a) 
 
3 An example of such qualities is assertiveness that may be better developed by those who have to establish their 
living conditions in a new environment than by those who remain with their everyday routines.  
4 We will refer to these skills as unobserved, noting that they are observed by the employer. 
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w i 2
H,S




H + T i1
H) + Q
H[  i          (4b). 
Indicating migrant workers by m=1 and stayers by m=0, we can collapse these equations into 
w i2
H = X i
 H‘D
H + \
H(T i0 + T i1)+ m i [(I
H-\
H) T i1 +J i] + Q
H[  i     (5). 
In sum, with the above assumptions, work stays abroad provide additional qualities to migrant 
workers that are expected to allow for differential remuneration as compared to non-migrant workers’ 
skills. Part of these qualities is unobservable. We expect that the differential remuneration is positive, 
reflecting the transfer of superior knowledge from the technologically more advanced foreign country 
into the home country, if the latter has the necessary capacities to adapt this knowledge. 
If stayers and movers do not differ by their unobserved characterisics [and if no unobserved 
skills J are to be developed abroad, differential returns from foreign working experience described by 
the term (I
H-\
H) in the above equation can be estimated in a simple OLS equation, accounting for 
migrants by a dummy variable interacted with working experience in t=1. However, if J 0, or if a 
worker’s status regarding her foreign working experience is correlated with her unobserved human 
capital component [, the former is no longer exogenous and requires distinguished consideration.  
Economic thinking of migration as laid down by Roy (1951) states that migration decisions 
are taken in response to the net expected benefit from the move: the individual will move if total gains 
net of the cost of the move are positive, and she will decline the opportunity otherwise. In this sense, 
in our application
5 potential migrants have expected benefits from wage increments that consist of two 
components: first, the differential income wage earned during the stay abroad (that is typically higher 
in EU member states than in accession countries), and the differential returns to their foreign work 
experience and skills developed abroad. The former is the difference between (3a) and (3b):  
w i1
F- w i1







H)T i0 + (Q
F-Q
H[ i         (6), 
and the latter is the difference between (4a) and (4b), noting that T i1
H and T i1
F only differ in 
the location, but not in the length of period:  
   w i2
H,M




H) T i1 +J i            (7). 
Accounting for differences in the length of the work stay abroad relative to the time span in 
which the returns from the investment can be enjoyed, by weights a and (1-a) and denoting the cost of 
                                                      
5 We disregard of permanent migration, implying that the below assertions hold conditional on negative net 
expected benefits from permanent emigration. This is e.g. the case if legal restrictions prevent 
permanent settlement and work abroad. We further disregard of uncertainty as concerns the future 
realisations of variables relevant to the decision to migrate. 
  7return migration by C
6, combining (5a) and (5b) and including an individual shift term Kresults in the 
following decision rule for assuming a temporary work assignment abroad. 
   P(mi =1)=1 if S i =a(w i1
F- w i1
H) + (1-a)( w i2
H,M- w i2
H,S) – C i + K i   












 T i 1+J i] - C i +K i> 0, 
and  P(m=1)=0 if S  0          ( 8 ) .  
The propensity to emigrate increases in the following observed characteristics: first, with 
sector-specific wage differentials in the host as against the source country. We can expect these to be 
positive in any pair of countries in the context of Eastern to Western emigration. Second, in the 
differential valuation of domestically acquired human capital abroad, that may be positive or negative 
depending on the profession. Third, with the valuation of foreign working experience as compared to 
experience from the same spell spent working at home, upon return. Finally, in the total cost of the 
temporary move abroad, Ci. The fact that typically only a small fraction of a country’s population 
chooses to emigrate reflects high related costs, be it of monetary, psychic or social nature.
7 
The propensity to migrate is positively related to both the unobserved human capital 
component [and the unobserved skill enhancement Ji. One may also think of the shift term Kҏto be 
correlated with unobserved earnings determinants, if it includes an unobserved characteristic that 
enhances earnings capacities and lowers the individual cost of emigration at the same time. Ability is 
an example for such a characteristic. These terms render the propensity to emigrate P(m) endogenous 
with respect to the earnings equation.  
2.2  Methodology 
Foreign working experience may offer the opportunity of skill upgrading to the migrant. Within the 
given regulatory constraints, participation in foreign working experience is based on a a voluntary 
decision, and it may result in a better labour market position upon return. With these features, a work 
stay abroad is comparable to an active labour market policy programme. 
The policy evaluation literature has adopted interest in two types of effects on programme 
participation: the impact of the programme on an average (random) individual from a sample of both 
                                                      
6 In the context of temporary migration, migration costs arise both with leaving the home country and with 
returning. Related monetary and psychic costs may arise with the search for a job, establishing and re-
establishing professional and private networks, housing relocation, and the like. 
7 In the present inquiry we disregard of emigration. In the terms of (7), we can think of C
E to be exorbitantly high 
for permanent settlement abroad. This assumption is realistic insofar as for the moment, most of the 
EU-15 countries have barred work immigration from the New Members. 
  8participants and non-participants, known as average treatment effect (ATE), and its impact on an 
average person from those who participate, known as the effect of the treatment to the treated (ATE1, 
where the subscript denotes treatment).
8 Formally, with the outcomes of interest such as earnings from 
work with and without treatment, w1 and w0 respectively, a participation index m with values 1 or 0, 
and an array of conditioning variables X, ATE=E(w1-w0|X) and ATE1=(w1-w0|X,m=1). The difference 
between the two effects is the person specific gain, i.e. the difference of the average individual 
stochastic term H with and without treatment, conditional on participation and a set of control 
variables. Formally, ATE–ATE1=E(H1-H0|X,m=1).
9 ATE and ATE1 will be equal only if programme 
participation and treatment outcomes are independent of each other.
10 This is, however, not the case if 
people make their choice based on their net expected benefit, i.e. self select into participation. Self 
selection, be it based on observed or unobservable factors, results in different sizes of the impact on 
the treated and the total population respectively.  
A difficulty in establishing both ATE and ATE1 is that components of both effects are 
counterfactuals: in the post programme period, one can either observe w1  but not w0  for the 
participants, or w0  but not w1  for the non-participants. Unless participation and outcomes are 
independent of each other, the estimation of these effects calls for specific techniques and identifying 
assumptions, depending on the type of selection. In particular, different estimators are suited to the 
analysis of selection on observables and unobservables respectively.
11 
Turning to our analysis of returning migrants’ earnings, using the policy evaluation 
terminology, the effect of treatment of the treated, ATE1, is the wage premium to labour market 
experience to those who have been abroad, while ATE is the wage premium to a random individual 
from the full sample. The observed outcomes are the earnings w2
H,M=E(w1,t|m=1) for movers, and 
w2
H,S=E(w0,t|m=0) for the stayers in the post-programme period t. If temporary migration does respond 
to the net expected benefit as outlined in section 2.1, ATE and ATE1 will differ, and selectivity needs 
to be accounted for specifically. 
In the evaluation framework, comparisons of treated and untreated individuals require some 
identifying assumption, i.e. a restriction on the differences between the two groups or before and after 
treatment outcomes respectively. Estimators available for cross-section datasets rely on the assumption 
that before treatment, outcomes for the treated and untreated are the same (conditional on observed 
characteristics), i.e. E(w0|X,m=0)=E(w0|X,m=1). In our application, this identifying assumption rules 
                                                      
8 For textbook discussions of the estimation of treatment effects, see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith 1999, and 
Wooldridge 2001: 603ff.  
9 See Wooldridge 2001: 607.  
10  See ibid.: 605. 
11 See the methodology discussion of econometric evaluation estimators of Heckman et al. (1999: 1941ff.).  
  9out systematic differences between movers and stayers by unobserved human capital characteristics 
that exist before the move. This requires Q
F-Q
H = 0 such that [ drops from the selection equation (8).
12  
If there are neither ex ante nor ex post differences between stayers’ and movers’ unobserved 
characteristics and no selection effects respectively, the premium to foreign working experience can be 
established as the mean difference of the two groups’ earnings conditional on the other human capital 
characteristics. If selection is nonrandom however, the following two cases can be distinguished, each 
calling for a specific estimation methodology. First, selection can be based on observed earnings 
determinants. As an example, individuals with certain occupations may be more likely to opt for a 
work stay abroad, if these occupations offer higher differential returns abroad as compared to the 
home country. With such selection assumptions, ATE1 can be estimated with instrumental variable 
(IV) or matching methods. This framework allows for unobserved gains from participation, but such 
gains must not impact on the participation decision. In our case, this implies either J= 0 or J 0 but 
Jnot to be among the arguments of the index function S. In the second case, unobserved gains are 
available from the treatment, and they are anticipated in the decision to participate, as described by 
equation (6). In this case, ATE1 cannot be consistently estimated with IV because instruments for the 
individual’s participation propensity will be correlated with the unobserved component of the post-
treatment outcome. Instead, ATE1 can be obtained from earnings functions corrected for sample 
selection. 
Our empirical analysis is placed in the most general framework that allows for unobserved 
gains from a work stay abroad to have an impact both on post return earnings and on the decision to 
move as well. In particular, we estimate an endogenous switching model, i.e. separate earnings 
functions for movers and stayers that include correction terms for selection into the respective 
regime.
13 In addition, we account for selectivity into labour market activity. This is motivated by the 
fact that the majority of the individuals making part of our sample are not working, which is in most 
cases due to unfinished education. The selection equations are estimated by probit, considering three 
cases: first, two independent probit equations describing independent decisions, second, seemingly 
                                                      
12 Note that, provided that this assumption is appropriate, our treatment effect estimates do not suffer from bias 
due to unobserved characteristics in the wage equation: such characteristics drop out of the index 
function Sso that movers and stayers respectively do not systematically differ on these lines, while the 
treatment effect, as a difference of treatment to no treatment earnings, is not affected anyway. 
Concerning the other components of the error term in the migration selection equation, expected 
unobserved gains from the move Jare accounted for by our methodology applied, while unobserved 
characteristics K do not play a role in the earnings function. 
13 An exemplary discussion and application of this methodology is provided in Heitmueller’s (2004) analysis of 
the public-private sector wage gap in Scotland. Regarding returns to foreign work experience, this 
methodology is also applied by Co et al. (1999) and (among others) by de Coulon and Piracha (2003). 
  10unrelated probit accounting for unobserved individual characteristics that may impact on both the 
labour force participation and the migration decision in a similar way (such as the number of children 
on which we do not have information), and, third, bivariate probit that models the work and foreign 
experience status as two dimensions of the same decision process. We then include the selection 
correction terms for active work status and the respective mover/stayer status into earnings functions 
estimated separately for the movers and stayers by OLS, and apply a Hausman test to investigate the 
equality of the obtained results. In the separate probits, the nonselection hazards related to labour force 
participation OL1, to being a stayer OM0 , and being a mover OM1 respectively are calculated as follows 
(Heitmueller, 2004):  
O iL1 = I(F i’P)/)(F i’P)           ( 9 a ) ,  
   O i M0 = – I(G i’G)/(1-)(G i’G) )          ( 9 b ) ,  
   and 
   O i M1 = I(G i’G)/)(G i’G)           ( 9 c ) ,  
where Iand )denote the standard normal density and distribution functions, while F i and Gi  
represent the vectors of covariates from the participation and mover/stayer probits, and Pand Gare the 
estimated coefficients from these functions respectively.  
The seemingly unrelated and the bivariate probit specifications provide for specific correction 
terms for labour force participation for each of the two earnings equations, since the decisions to work 
and to move are jointly modelled. Denoting the bivariate standard distribution function with )2, with 
the correlation coefficient between the standard errors of the two equations Uand with n=(1-U²)
-0.5, for 
the stayers’ earnings equation, the two correction terms are 
O i L1,0  = I(F i’P) )[n(G i’GUF i’P)] /)2 (G i’GF i’GU)                  (10a)
 and  
O  i M0,1  = I(G i’G) )[n(F i’PUG i’G)] /)2 (G i’GF i’PU)                 (10b),  
while for the movers’ earnings equation, these terms are  




 i M1,1  = I(G i’G) )[n(F i’PUG i’G)] /)2 (G i’GF i’PU)                   (10d). 
For comparison, we also present joint OLS estimates of stayers’ and movers’ wages including 
a dummy variable for the latter that provides the mean difference estimator of returns to foreign 
experience. Note however that this estimator is consistent and unbiased only if there are no systematic 
differences in stayers’ and movers’ characteristics, whether observed or unobserved. The variables 
included into the selection and earnings equations respectively are explained in the next section. 
  113 The  data 
3.1 Dataset  and  variables 
Our empirical research makes use of the 2003 spring wave of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 
(CCEB). This survey is a special draw of the CCEB that extends over citizens
14 aged 15 to 24. The 
CCEB and its EU member state counterpart, the Eurobarometer (EB) are regular surveys of public 
opinion on important topics of European citizenship released by the European Commission. They are 
typically conducted twice a year by national institutes of the EU member states and canditate countries 
respectively.
15 Some collections cover special topics. Such a round was the 2003 spring CCEB where 
the situation of the youth was examined. EB data have been widely used for political economy topics. 
In the context of migration, Krieger (2004), for example, draws upon EB data to account for the 
migration potential from Eastern Europe, based on statements of the willingness to emigrate. This rich 
dataset enables novel analysis. In particular, a consistent set of source country socio-economic micro 
data including information on work related stays abroad and covering a broad range of host countries 
has to our knowledge not been used so far. The multiplicity of source and destination countries 
considered may offer a broader picture on the topic than the existing single country studies, especially 
since migration regimes tend to have strong country specific characteristics. 
The Youth CCEB 2003 was collected in March and April 2003 in the ten EU applicant 
countries that became EU members in 2004 as well as in Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. On average, 
approx. 800 interviews were conducted in each of these countries, except for Cyprus and Malta with 
half as many interviewees, and Bulgaria, where around 1000 persons were interviewed. The total size 
of the cross-country sample is 9754.
16 We restrict the analysis to the subsample of males, for women’s 
labour market behaviour is likely to be governed by different patterns. In addition, a separate analysis 
of the subsample of females would be impeded by the low number of cases with active labour market 
status and foreign work related experience.
17 The subsample of males includes 4876 individuals. From 
                                                      
14 In Estonia, permanent residents were considered instead. Another irregularity refers to the case of Cyprus 
where only the Republic was covered.  
15 For the Eastern EU applicant countries, surveys called Eastern European Eurobarometer were conducted in 
1992 to 1997. After a four-year break, the series was re-launched in 2000, under the new label 
Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. 
16 The interviews were selected by a multi-stage random probability sampling procedure. The national surveys 
are representative with respect to NUTS 2 area coverage, region types, the distribution of population 
and nationalities respectively, and settlement types. 
17 The dataset offers 37 records of females with foreign work related experience that contain all variables needed. 
Tentative estimation results for females are available from the author upon request.  
  12these, we discard Turkey and an additional 565 cases due to missing data. The summary statistics and 
probit estimation results described in section 3.2 are based on a final sample containing information on 
3831 individuals. From these, another 45 observations (three of which are of movers) are lost in the 
earnings regressions because of missing data on regressors.  
We distinguish between working and nonworking individuals based on information on their 
basic activity and their main source of regular income. A person is considered working if he pursues a 
regular job, casual work, or black market activities. Related to income, the individuals were asked how 
much they personally get on average per month. Additionally, information is provided on the source of 
this income. We define income from work as income stemming from either of the above activities. 
Income is provided in euro (as well as in national currencies). A distinction between net and gross 
terms is unfortunately not made, but the lack of precision of the question suggests that net revenues are 
likely to be reported at least by employees. The measure, however, may be ambiguous for the self 
employed. Information on the hours worked per month is lacking so that we need to proxy wages with 
earnings. We can control for regular or part time work assignments however. 
Our foreign work experience variable is positive if the individual has been in either of the 15 
EU member states as of 2003, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, or Norway for work or business related 
reasons in the past two years. The data do not distinguish genuine work assignments abroad from 
occasional business trips. As our aim is to establish evidence on West to East transfer of human 
capital, we do not think that this broad definition poses a severe problem. We, however, also explored 
the magnitude of the divergence between a narrow and broad definition of the foreign work experience 
indicator. In the standard CCEB surveys of 2001 to 2003 where questions on the countries visited are 
put differently, around 3.3 per cent of the surveyed report to have worked in either of the above 
countries.
18 In comparison, in our original dataset, 2.8 per cent report work or business related travels 
to these countries. Second, participation in business meetings, conferences, fairs and other professional 
encounters abroad will also offer ample opportunity to acquire new standards, meet new technologies, 
and adapt one’s skills and comportment, and will thus also add to the transfer of knowledge from 
Western to Eastern Europe.
19 Therefore, the ambiguity finally relates to the amount of time spent 
abroad, i.e. the length or frequency of the stays. The fact that our data only records travels and stays 
abroad in the two years prior to the survey is unlikely to sizeably blur the picture. If differential human 
capital acquired during a work stay abroad has not materialized in positive returns within two years 
upon return, it may rather depreciate than turn effective. 
                                                      
18 Unfortunately, the standard CCEB data have shortcomings that impede their evaluation with regard to earnings 
premia to returning migrants.  
19 For simplicity, we refer to any of these cases as “return migration”. The heterogeneity of the cases covered 
should be borne in mind.  
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follows: 2451 individuals i.e. 64 per cent are non-working, of which 50 persons (2 per cent) report 
work related stays abroad. From the working subsample of 1380 (36 per cent of total), 95 i.e. 7 per 
cent report such stays abroad. The considerably lower share of those with foreign working experience 
among the non working is not surprising given that the majority report to pursue their education.  
In addition to work status, foreign work experience status, and income, our analysis makes use 
of information on the individual’s personal status (single or couple), education level (where we 
distinguish three categories), potential work experience, occupation (either of four categories, or 
unspecified), the type of her settlement (three types), and her country of residence. Precise definitions 
of the variables are given in the appendix. 
3.2 Summary  statistics 
Summary statistics of the data are provided in tables 1-3 (see the appendix). By the categories 
distinguished above, our sample has the following features: typically, against those who are not in the 
labour market,
20 those working are older (21.2 years on average against 18.4 years), are more likely to 
live with a partner (in the two groups, 11 and 2 per cent report such a state respectively), have 
finished school a longer time ago (4.7 years against 3.8), are better educated (two thirds have finished 
secondary education, while two thirds of the non-working have only primary education finished), and 
have a slight tendency to be concentrated in large towns (31 against 29 per cent of the non-working, 
but also with weaker presence in smaller towns – 33 against 36 per cent of the non-working). These 
differences reflect that most of the non-working have not finished their education yet. There are also 
country differences in labour force participation: comparatively higher levels are typical of the Czech 
and the Slovak Republics, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, and Slovenia, while labour force participation is 
below average in in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland.  
More than 50 per cent of the working individuals with Western European work related 
experience are nationals of Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Hungary. Among the destination countries, 
most important are the large EU-15 member states – Germany, France, Italy, and the UK –, and 
neighbouring countries, such as Austria for Hungarians and Slovenians, Greece for Bulgarians, 
Finland for Estonians and Sweden for citizens of the Baltic countries. Part of the individuals with 
Western European working experience have been to several destination countries.
21 
                                                      
20 For the sake of simpler expression, we include the unemployed in this category as well.  
21 Note that the above figures do not give a fully accurate picture on the destination countries of foreign working 
experience, since we have included cases of that cover multiple stays in Western European countries 
  14Comparing those with foreign work related stays in the last two years with those who have not 
had such stays, the former are more likely to live with a partner, be better educated, and have finished 
school longer ago than the latter. They are on average 22.1 years old (stayers: 19.3 years) and have 
finished school 5.1 years ago (stayers: 4.1 years). Besides, 17 per cent live with a partner (5 per cent of 
the non movers), 75 per cent have secondary and 8 per cent have tertiary education (stayers: 46 and 3 
per cent respectively). These differences between the two groups are parallel to those between the 
working and non-working: this suggests that the two state variables may describe outcomes of a joint 
decision. By type of settlement, there are no significant differences between the movers and stayers: 
roughly one third come from rural areas, small towns, and large towns respectively. Also, there are 
fewer country differences between these groups than in the case of labour force participation: movers 
are rather concentrated in Estonia and Lithuania, while there are less represented in in Cyprus and the 
Czech Republic. 
Finally, looking at differences between movers and stayers conditional on labour force 
participation, the former earn substantially more than the latter: the average monthly work income of 
the movers amounts to 157 per cent of the stayers’ earnings, 345 against 219 euro.
22 Besides, the 
former are more likely to live with a partner (22 against 11 per cent), they are less frequently 
occupying part time jobs (33 against 47 per cent), and they possess a better education (73 per cent 
have secondary education and 8 per cent have tertiary education, against 65 and 5 per cent of the 
stayers respectively). Concerning their occupation, managers and self-employed are over represented 
among the movers: 10 and 8 per cent are in these occupations against 5 and 4 per cent of the stayers. 
We find no significant country specific differences between these two groups.  
4 Estimation  results 
4.1  Specifications of the estimating equations 
We assess potential earnings differentials of young Eastern Europeans with and without Western 
European work related experience in an endogenous switching regression framework, as explained in 
section 2.2. This model implies the estimation of a reduced form probit describing the propensity to go 
for such experience as a first step. From the results, correction terms for the nonselection hazard – 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with different purposes. These cases unambiguously relate to Western European work related 
experience, but the data do not allow to match the purpose and the country of the stay. 
22 The income figures provided in table 3 may appear very low. Note however that these are averages of young 
people’s earnings in transition countries, many of which hold part time jobs, and some of which are 
labour market entrants.  
  15inverse Mill’s ratios – can be recovered. These are then used in the OLS estimation of separate 
earnings functions for stayers and movers respectively. In addition to selection into the mover/stayer 
status, we account for selection into the labour force. The high inactivity rate in our sample that relates 
to unfinished education suggests the presence of such a selection effect in particular. As for the 
specification of the selection probits, three cases are distinguished: first, two separate probit equations 
for labour force participation and foreign work experience respectively, second, seemingly unrelated 
probit equations, and, third, the modelling of the respective decisions as outcomes of a bivariate probit 
model.
23 We then estimate the earnings equations in several versions distinguished by way sample 
selection is corrected for: a first pair of equations is estimated without selection parameters, a second 
is run with correction for labour force participation from the univariate probit regression. Three pairs 
of earnings regressions are then provided with correction terms for both work and mover/stayer status, 
that are calculated from the univariate probit, the seemingly unrelated probit, and the bivariate probit 
respectively. We present estimation results for the selection probit equations in table 6 and for the 
earnings equation in tables 7 (for stayers) and 8 (for movers). The latter also include the results of a 
Hausman test of the equality of the coefficients (we have excluded the country dummies and selection 
terms from the test). For comparison, OLS estimation results with a dummy variable for foreign 
working experience are shown in table 5. Stayers’ and movers’ earnings for the two groups 
respectively predicted from the specifications are, finally, reported in table 15.  
As mentioned before, the sample is restricted to young males. All regressions contain 
dummies for the respective source country. Dummies for education levels and the type of settlement 
are used both for the selection and the earnings equations. The first are to reflect opportunity costs of 
foregone leisure, while both sets of dummies are to describe the availability of job opportunities both 
domestically and abroad. These effects should be relevant both for the selection and the earnings 
equations. Marital status
24 is assumed to play a role in both participation decisions: we expect males 
living with a partner to face more family responsibility and to be therefore more likely to work. The 
expected effect of living with a spouse or partner on the willingness to go abroad is unclear, though: 
one could expect such males to pursue higher professional aspirations and take opportunities of 
training abroad, but such people may be expected to be less mobile than singles as well. Based on 
these considerations, we include a marital status dummy in both selection equations.  
                                                      
23 Note that both the seemingly unrelated probit and the bivariate probit allow for nozero correlation of the error 
terms of the two probits estimated. In the case of the latter, the two probits are estimated with the same 
set of regressors, while in the former, one variable in each equation is excluded from the other. In our 
application, the seemingly unrelated probits are estimated with the same regressors as the independent 
probits, with the decisive difference that error correlation is accounted for.  
24 In our analysis we make no distinction between marriage and nonmarital cohabitation of couples.  
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expect the time passed since the finishing of education to matter for labour force participation and to 
capture difficulties of labour market entry in particular. In contrast, time passed since leaving school 
should not necessarily matter for taking the chance of a work related stay abroad: although labour 
market entry difficulties prevail in Western Europe as well, anecdotal evidence suggests that in these 
countries, there is a number of job training opportunities for young people without substantial work 
experience more or less easily available to foreigners, such as traineeships. Instead, we include age in 
the foreign working experience probit. Younger people should be more likely to participate in work 
related stays abroad, due to their lower cost of relocation. On the other hand, one may also expect a 
reverse effect that reflects increasing independence, given that the individuals in our sample are aged 
24 and less. The inclusion of age among the regressors in the first probit but not in the second of 
potential experience in the latter but not in the first provides for the distinction between seemingly 
unrelated and bivariate probit. Note that a seemingly unrelated probit model of the two decisions with 
the same set of variables in both equations results in bivariate probit.  
In addition to the education and settlement type related dummy variables as stated above, our 
earnings equations contain dummies for part-time work, activity in the black economy, and 
employment in the public sector. In addition, we control for four types of professions: manual and 
white collar worker, manager, and self employed person respectively. For a number of individuals 
reported to be working, there is no information on the occupation: “unspecified occupation” is our 
(presumably heterogenous) omitted category. Although no identification requirement prohibits the 
inclusion of a variable in both a selection equation and the earnings equation (because identification is 
provided for by functional form assumptions), we have not included potential experience in the 
reported earnings regressions because it proved insignificant.  
Note that in our OLS regressions, we employ categorical explanatory variables in a 
semilogarithmic model. The relative change in the dependent variable in levels related to the factor 
represented by the dummy variable can be recovered as the exponential of the coefficient minus 1 (see 
Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). The discussion of our results is based on this transformation. In table 
9, we present the transformed coefficients of the earnings functions for stayers and movers 
summarized in tables 7 and 8. 
The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer contains information on conversation level language 
skills of the interviewees. As an extension of our analysis, we have re-estimated the earnings functions 
with control variables for proficiency of any Western European language, distinguishing languages 
related to a visit in a respective country in the past two years, and languages of other Western 
European countries. Accounting for the knowledge of Western European languages allows 
investigating specifically whether employers’ valuation of foreign work experience is driven by the 
linguistic proficiency of the potential employee, which may be acquired domestically to some extent 
  17as well. Among the language skills matched by a stay in a respective country, we cannot distinguish 
whether such skills were acquired during a work related or other type of stay. The acquisition of 
language skills may suffer from endogeneity with respect to the decision to participate in a stay 
abroad. We do not specifically address this potential source of bias. Results for the earnings functions 
with the same selection correction terms as used for the base model are given in tables 10 and 11. 
To investigate our interpretation that higher pay for individuals with Western European work 
related experience in the EU accession countries is due to the diffusion of skills practiced in the 
economies of the EEA of 2003 that facilitate the catching up and economic integration of the Eastern 
European economies with the former, we have re-run our estimation procedure with foreign work 
experience made in Eastern, instead of Western, European countries. Individuals who assume work 
abroad in Eastern Europe prove mobility and mental flexibility as well. However, we expect that the 
potential for knowledge diffusion among former members of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance is substantially below the potentialities in the West to East European perspective. This 
analysis should exclude individuals with Western European working experience. Indeed, there are 23 
such observations among those with and 70 among those without Eastern European work experience. 
However, excluding these leaves us with 46 observations with positive migration and labour force 
participation status, which has proven insufficient for strong results. Therefore, we provide estimation 
results for the earnings functions related to Eastern European working experience in tables 13 and 14 
and the respective participation probits in table 12, based on data that contain individuals with Western 
European work related experience as well, which is however not specifically accounted for. The mean 
difference estimator of the earnings with and without Eastern European work related experience is 
summarized in column C of table 5. We also provide the mean difference estimator of the earnings 
function on the subsample of which individuals with Western European work related experience are 
removed (table 5, column D).  
In addition to the regressions reported in the appendix, we have run further specifications to 
check for the robustness of our findings. We do not report the respective results in detail. In qualitative 
terms, they do not alter the discussed findings. Among others, we have repeated the regressions 
leaving out the observations with primary education only. We have further applied country demeaned 
income, calculating separate means by country for movers and stayers respectively. Further, we have 
tried for the relevance of the individual’s attitude towards foreigners in both the selection and the 
earnings equations: assuming that xenophobia is exogenous to foreign work related experience, one 
could well argue that more xenophobic individuals are less likely to head for a work stay in Western 
Europe, i.e. that they have higher related cost. Also, xenophobia could be motivated by fear from 
competition and thus reflect the individual’s labour market position and unobserved ability 
respectively. We have not found, however, attitude towards foreigners to have explanatory power in 
either of our equations. 
  184.2  Estimation results: selection equations 
The results of the separate probit estimations and the seemingly unrelated probit are very similar. The 
error terms of the two choice equations are significantly but weakly correlated with each other, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.15. The bivariate probit estimation provides somewhat different results. 
Here, a correlation coefficient between the error terms of the choice equations of 0.1 is found. Both 
sets of results provide suggestive evidence of a common component in the error terms to impact on 
both the decision to work and to go abroad respectively. Based on the log likelihood statistic, the 
bivariate probit appears to be the most appropriate specification. The improvement of the statistic in 
comparison with the separate probits is, however, modest. While the bivariate probit is empirically 
more generous, the first two probit specifications are rather supported by a reasoned choice of 
regressors. We will discuss the results from the first two sets of probit regressions and the bivariate 
probit in turn.  
The estimation results of the univarite probits on labour force participation include the 
following: first, young males living with a partner are more likely to work than singles. The effect is 
much stronger if the choices of work and mover/stayer status are assumed to be two separate 
decisions. Marital status has the strongest effect on labour force participation from the individual’s 
personal characteristics: it increases the probability by 0.85 standard deviations. Comparing two 
individuals with average characteristics, the person having a spouse or partner is 33 percentage points 
more likely to be working than the person having no such relationship. We find working experience to 
influence the probability of labour force participation of young male Eastern Europeans as expected. 
This effect is not very strong, though. For an average individual, one more year of potential working 
experience increases the likelihood to work by 6 percentage points. Labour force participation 
increases in education levels. An average young man having only primary school education is 28 
percentage points less likely to work than a similar man with secondary education, while tertiary 
education increases this probability by 10 percentage points. Compared with small towns, young 
males in rural areas are slightly more likely to be working. Everything else equal, the difference in the 
probability to work is 3 percentage points. We do not find systematic differences in labour force 
participation between small and large towns. Among the countries considered, some are found to have 
specifically particularly low labour force participation rates among the young males, in particular 
Cyprus, Latvia, Poland, and Romania.  
Turning to the results on the probability to go for work related reasons abroad, our univariate 
probit regressions provide the following results. It is not the younger but the older young men who are 
more likely to go to Western Europe for professional reasons. One year more of age increases the 
respective probability in the case of a young man with otherwise average characteristics by 0.75 
percentage points. This is not as low as it may appear, keeping in mind that the share of people with 
foreign work related experience in the sample is below 4 per cent.  
  19The better educated are more likely to participate in Western European work related stays. 
There are no significant differences between those with secondary and tertiary level education, but 
those lacking such degrees are significantly less likely to go abroad. From the first probit equation, we 
find that having no secondary or better education reduces the probability of an average individual to 
go abroad by 1.3 percentage points. The seemingly unrelated probit regression provides a somewhat 
stronger effect. The propensity to go for work abroad is not found to vary by type of settlement. 
Across countries, higher probabilities are predicted in particular for Lithanian, Maltese and Polish 
young men as well as, in the case of the seemingly unrelated probit, for Estonians.  
The results for the bivariate probit are different from those discussed above in the following 
respects. Looking first at labour force participation, as of marriage or cohabitation, a considerably 
weaker but still highly significant effect is estimated. While experience is significant only 
quadratically, we find that the likelihood of labour force participation is strongly increasing in age. 
Note that age is not among the regressors in the other two probit equations on labour force 
participation. Another important difference against the results discussed previously is that people are 
found less likely to work if they possess tertiary level education. The results for the migration probit 
do not differ substantially from those discussed for the univariate specifications discussed above.  
In table 12, we also provide the selection equations for Eastern European foreign work 
experience. The differences found for the probability of labour force participation from the seemingly 
unrelated and bivariate probit are negligible as compared to the base model with Western European 
experience. Noteworthy differences in the probability of foreign work related stays in Eastern as 
compared to Western Europe are, first, that we do not find education levels to matter for the latter. 
Second, as compared to individuals from Poland, foreign work experience in other Eastern European 
countries is significantly higher among Latvians, Lithuanians and Slovaks – as well as among 
Romanians according to the bilateral probit estimation results – and lower in Cyprus, while similar 
country characteristics are not found for Western European work related experience. The higher 
propensity of Eastern European work experience abroad among the nationals of the aforementioned 
countries certainly relates to the ethnic minorities in these countries (Russians in the Baltic countries, 
Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia). Finally, the estimations for Eastern European work abroad 
show stronger correlation in the error terms of the equations for labour force participation and foreign 
work experience.  
4.3  Earnings of stayers and movers 
Our model described in section 2.1 formulates differential returns to foreign work experience to 
materialise in the coefficient to the dummy variable indicating such experience. Empirically, one may 
allow for interactions of this dummy with other determinants of the earnings function, to account for 
  20the possibility that foreign working experience is mediated by the individual’s other characteristics. 
The endogenous switching model allows for this possibility in the most generous way, for different 
earnings functions are estimated for stayers and movers. Our empirical application does in fact yield 
different earnings equations for stayers and movers. Below, we describe these in turn. The earnings 
premia expressed as ratios as compared to the case characterised by the omitted dummies are 
summarized in table 9.  
According to our estimation results for stayers, those occupying part-time jobs earn 26 to 28 
per cent less than those working full time. Unrecorded economic activity yields a premium of around 
23 per cent. In the specification without corrections for selection, we find a premium of 9 per cent for 
activities in the public sector. This result is however not confirmed by the selectivity corrected 
specifications. Compared to those with secondary level education, those lacking such a degree earn 
substantially less, while those having higher education obtain considerably more. The different 
specifications yield somewhat different coefficients. The curtailment to be accepted by the least 
educated is highest in the equation without correction, amounting to 44 per cent as compared to those 
with secondary education. The other equations produce coefficients that imply a reduction of 22 or 30 
per cent. Similarly, the returns to occupations are different across specifications. There is however a 
consistent order of such returns as compared to the observations where an occupation has not been 
specified: manual and white collar workers obtain differential returns that are comparable in size, but 
lower than those of the other professional groups considered. The returns to self employment are 
estimated to be highest, in particular higher than those obtained by holders of managerial positions. 
For the self employed, we find earnings premia as compared to the omitted category of unspecified 
occupation that are 10 to 60 percentage points higher than for manual workers. In the case of the self 
employed, one may suspect that earnings have been overstated in the survey. The differences between 
managers’ and manual workers’ earnings appear rather low – in fact, the specification with selection 
correction terms from the bivariate probit estimation yields lower returns to the former than to the 
latter –, but they may be explained by the short professional careers of the individuals, especially those 
in positions requiring higher education. In addition, these results may also reflect that young Eastern 
Europeans tend to be found in leading positions of young firms or not for profit organisations that 
cannot offer overly high rewards for their activity. While people living in rural areas are not found to 
incur lower pay as compared to those in small towns, young males living in large cities earn 17 to 27 
per cent more than the former, depending on the specification. The country dummies reflect common 
sense about the income levels of the countries surveyed: Earnings are highest in Cyprus, Malta, 
Slovenia, and Hungary, and lowest in Bulgaria and Romania. Average salaries of Cypriots are around 
three to four times higher than of Polish nationals.  
A decisive feature of our methodology is the consideration of selection effects. In this regard, 
our specifications provide ambiguous results. We find a negative coefficient for the non-selection 
hazard relating to labour force participation in all specifications of stayers’ earnings (see table 7). The 
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coefficient of the error terms between the selection and the earnings regression: its sign allows reading 
off the type of selection. It can thus be seen that in our sample, is those with less favourable earnings 
capabilities rather choose to work. This result is intuitive for that many of the non working in our 
sample are pursuing their education. Looking at the decision to stay, results are sensitive to the 
specification of the probit equations from which the non-selection hazards are obtained. The 
significant error correlation of the two probit equations supports specification (4) or (5) in table 7. The 
correction terms as described in equation (10b) account for non-selection into non-migration: a 
positive coefficient implies negative correlation between the error terms relating to the propensity to 
stay, and to stayers’ earnings. Hence, specification (4) suggests that those who are rather likely to stay 
receive lower stayers’ earnings than a random individual from the sample. 
As of the movers, part time workers earn 36 per cent less than those occupying full time jobs. 
Other than for stayers, we do not find a premium for either black market activities or employment in 
the public sector. All specifications reveal a strong negative impact of lacking secondary or higher 
education on earnings of 40 to 50 per cent. The predicted coefficients are higher in the specifications 
that do not account for selection into the mover status. Similarly, these specifications predict an 
earnings premium for those who hold a tertiary level degree of 50 per cent, a result that is not 
confirmed once selection into foreign work experience is controlled for. On the ordering of returns to 
the four occupations distinguished, the specifications bear similar results: The self employed are 
predicted to earn most, more than twice as much as those from the “unspecified” category, followed 
by the white collar workers, who obtain 90 to 100 per cent more. Managers and manual workers are 
predicted to obtain earnings that are by around 60 per cent and 44 per cent higher respectively, but this 
latter result is again insignificant in the specifications controlling for selection in foreign experience. 
Interestingly, the regressions with correction terms from the probits with error correlation predict that 
young males with foreign experience living in rural areas earn 35 per cent more than those located in 
small towns. For large towns, no such effect is found. Young people from Malta are found to have 
highest earnings, while lowest income prevails in Bulgaria and Romania. The country dummy for the 
Czech Republic is also, consistently across specifications, around one standard deviation below the 
average of all countries. Finally, no specification does provide significant selection correction terms 
for either labour force participation or work related stay in Western Europe. Apparently, those 
individuals who have chosen this experience do just as good upon return than any random individual. 
From comparing the earnings equations for movers and stayers respectively, the following 
insights emerge. Part time working stayers are less unfavourably paid than part time working movers, 
compared to their full time working counterparts. Certainly, this may be due to differences in the 
average hours worked in these two groups. On the other hand, the results may reflect situations where 
better jobs that are specifically targeted at those with foreign experience demand full time presence, 
while temporary jobs chosen by the migrants do not offer possibilities to make use of the specific 
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of around 25 per cent appears reasonable, thinking of respective jobs as probably not the most 
prestigious and well paid, and considering saved deductions for taxes and social security contributions. 
The insignificant coefficients in the movers’ equation may reflect that the pay in formal jobs for those 
with work related foreign experience outperforms the black market pay of similar individuals enough 
to counterbalance the tax advantage of the latter, assuming that specific qualities acquired abroad are 
more likely to be demanded and rewarded in formal labour markets. Looking at education levels, the 
estimated difference in pay between those with and without a secondary degree is considerably higher 
for movers. On the other hand, additional rewards for a tertiary degree are robustly found for stayers 
but not for movers. This can be seen as evidence suggesting that professions requiring only primary 
education do not offer much opportunity for the acquisition of such skills abroad that are valuable in 
domestic labour markets. Besides, higher education is not rewarded per se among the movers: this 
may reflect that among the movers, careers with higher salaries are also available to those with 
secondary education only. It could also be the case that earnings premia for foreign working 
experience becomes effective later in the careers of the highly educated, bearing in mind that such 
individuals in our sample must be at the beginning of their professional development. Finally, while 
stayers obtain higher earnings in large cities, among the movers it is, in contrast, those in rural areas 
who obtain additional rewards. Since movers’ proven international mobility may translate into 
domestic mobility as well, this finding may reflect the differential compensation that movers with 
specific qualities expect to receive in such areas in order to stay there.  
We have checked for the equality of the coefficients except those for the country dummies, the 
selection correction terms and the constant in the stayers’ and movers’ equation by the means of a 
Hausman test. The results are reported in the bottom rows of table 8. Based on this test, the equality of 
the earnings premia related to the human capital and job characteristics that we tested for can be 
rejected in all specifications but the one with the selection correction terms obtained from the bivariate 
probit equations. 
The earnings equations for stayers and movers with control variables for EU language skills 
are presented in tables 10 and 11 respectively. The additional control variables leave most results 
qualitatively unchanged, including the results of the Hausman test on the equality of the main 
coefficients in the two equations. From the language dummies, we find that stayers obtain an earnings 
premium of 22 to 32 per cent for language skills that relate to destination countries of recent visits, 
whereas there is no significant premium to proficiency in other Western European languages. For the 
movers, we do not find a premium for proficiency in either type of language.
25 I.e., the knowledge of 
                                                      
25 Note that there is variation in the “EU language, visited” variable among the movers as well: part of the 
individuals have reported a work related stay in a Western European country but have not indicated 
  23Western European countries’ languages is indeed an asset in Eastern Europe, but according to our 
results, it is not these skills specifically for which individuals with Western European working 
experience are better paid. This finding is also supported by the results of the mean difference 
estimator presented in column B of table 5 that similarly shows a premium for Western European of 
around 22 per cent.
26 As a further difference against the estimations without the language dummies, no 
specification reveals a premium for tertiary education for the movers, and the curtailment for lacking 
secondary education is not robust across specifications either.  
Looking at foreign work related experience acquired in Eastern European countries, the 
stayers’ equation is broadly similar to the equation estimated for the non-movers to Western Europe: 
indeed, most of the observations are identical, and the selection correction terms do not change much. 
For the movers, we obtain fewer significant coefficients. In particular, we do not find a penalty for the 
lack of secondary education in all specifications, and no specification yields a premium for tertiary 
education. Interestingly, among those with Eastern work related experience abroad, we find positive 
selection into an active work status in most specifications. Most important however, the Hausman test 
does not allow to reject the equality of the tested coefficients. Finally, while the mean difference 
estimator still shows a premium to Eastern European work related experience, the significance of the 
respective coefficient vanishes once we exclude the observations with Western European experience 
from the sample (table 5, colums C and D). We interpret these results as indicative evidence that it is 
indeed the superior skills acquired in the more advanced economies or cultural knowledge to facilitate 
the economic ties with these economies that is valuated by employers in Eastern Europe, and not just 
proven flexibility.  
Earnings predicted from the different specifications, both of the stayers’ and the movers’ 
equation, are presented in table 8 by these two categories (in euro). All specifications predict higher 
earnings for movers by around 70 to 75 euro (depending on specification) or around one third of an 
average young stayer’s salary, both if they choose to move as they did and if they had not decided to 
do so. Besides, on average, participating in a work related stay abroad results in better salaries both for 
the de facto movers and the stayers of a similarly 30 per cent. These findings allow to conclude the 
following: first, those who go abroad are equipped with considerably better earnings capabilities than 
those who do not. This is consistent with the finding of a negative truncation effect in the earnings 
equation of the stayers. Second, in the present comparative static framework, a returnee from a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
conversation level proficiency of the language of the respective country. Part of these individuals are 
likely to have performed unskilled labour without specific linguistic requirements, while others may 
have worked in an international environment or may have reported travels to business gatherings that 
required the knowledge of English or French instead of the official language of the destination country.  
26 The estimation results without language dummies presented in column B imply an earnings premium of 29 per 
cent for those with Western European working experience. 
  24Western European work related stay from either of the factual movers’ or stayers’ group can expect a 
higher salary with this experience. We interpret this as evidence for the transfer of specific skills 
acquired in the West to the Eastern European economies. We do not find, however, evidence of 
differences in the extent of the premium to foreign a foreign work stay.  
5  Conclusion 
In the present study, we have investigated earnings differences between young males from Central and 
Eastern Europe with and without Western European work related experience respectively, using the 
Central and Eastern Youth Eurobameter dataset of spring 2003 in an endogenous switching regression 
framework that generously allows for differences in the earnings functions of the two groups 
considered as well as for the consideration of selection into such experience, be it on observables or 
unobservables. We have found a premium to Western European work experience of around one third 
of a stayer’s earnings. In addition, our estimations highlighted specific differences in the rewards for 
various human capital characteristics of stayers and movers respectively. Among others, the less 
educated of the movers fare significantly worse than of the stayers, compared with the better educated 
in the respective group. Our findings further include evidence that among the individuals surveyed, the 
decisions to work and to go abroad respectively have at least a common (unobserved) determining 
factor or are taken simultaneously. Our results provide inconclusive evidence of selection in going 
abroad to work or not: while stayers are found to have worse stayers’ earnings than movers, our 
estimations are unable to reveal significant differences in movers’ earnings of both groups or in the 
gains from moving between the two groups, and selection effects are not found significant in the 
movers’ earnings equation.  
Irrespective of the existence of such effects, the increased earnings capability of those with 
Western European work related experience in Central European labour markets is evident and stable 
across specifications. Since potential endogeneity of selection is taken into account as far as the data 
permit, we can safely interpret this as evidence of substantial skills transmission from Western to 
Eastern Europe via international labour mobility. Further research is needed however to elaborate on 
this result. In particular, remaining ambiguities in our findings on selection effects and predicted 
earnings differentials need to be looked at.  
Our analysis shows that temporary work migration is beneficial to the source country 
economies. However, it contains somewhat worrying implications as well. In particular, we find that 
the propensity to participate in Western European work related experience is comparatively lower 
among those with low education levels. With the result of substantial earnings premia to such 
experience, temporary migration appears to improve the labour market situation of those who are in a 
relatively advantageous position already, instead of providing a way out of poor conditions for the 
  25most disadvantaged. Speculating a bit, we may conclude that temporary migration adds to earnings 
inequality.  
Our findings suggest that return migration that has become possible after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain is providing a mechanism to foster the catching up of the Eastern European economies. From 
a policy perspective, our results support the call for the extension of opportunities for temporary work 
migration to the Western economies, e.g. by exchange programmes or training schemes, in order to 
enhance such positive effects. In a longer term perspective, this is rather relevant for the countries of 
the Western Balkans, since all old EU members will have to grant free labour mobility to the citizens 
of the accession countries seven years after their EU entry at latest. On the other hand, the Eastern 
European source countries can similarly adopt appropriate measures to foster the return of their 
nationals working abroad who would otherwise become permanent emigrés. This will be even more 
important when the restrictions to labour mobility within the enlarged EU expire. Although first 
experiences with labour mobility in the enlarged EU do not yet allow to investigate the conditions 
under which East to West European labour migration is temporary or permanent, experiences with the 
Southern European enlargement are positive: allowing for unrestricted labour mobility has in fact 
encouraged return migration to the source countries in the Mediterranean. One can optimistically 
speculate that with free labour mobility in the enlarged EU, increased temporary moves will further 
contribute to the catching up of the Eastern European economies and the spread of more advanced 
techniques and standards. 
Certainly, a limitation to the insights to be drawn from our study is the angle of partial 
equilibrium analysis. However, return migration from Central and Eastern to Western Europe is 
unlikely to take such dimensions that would put partial equilibrium results into question, even after the 
full introduction of EU-wide labour mobility.  
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  28Appendix 
Description of variables 
Income: The CCEB contains information on the individual’s regular monthly income (in Euro) as 
well as its source. Our income variable uses the income level contained in the survey if the 
main source is a regular job, casual work, or some black market activity. If information on the 
main source is missing but the individual’s occupation suggests regular work (i.e. either of the 
following categories: manual worker, white collar worker, manager, self employed – while the 
categories left out of consideration include unemployed, houseperson, student, retired, and 
other). In the regression analyses, we employ the logarithm of the income variable. 
Couple: The CCEB distinguishes between the following marital and personal status of the individuals 
respectively: married, living as married, single, divorced, separated, and widowed. We assign 
value 1 to a dummy variable related to individuals living with their partner in case of either of 
the first two categories, and 0 otherwise.  
Experience: The CCEB contains the number of years passed since the individual has finished 
education. We use these figures to describe potential work experience.  
Education levels: The CCEB offers detailed information on the individual’s education level that is 
adjusted to national education systems and degrees. We summarize these education levels to 
three categories: primary education (i.e. elementary school), secondary education (up to 
completed high school), and tertiary education (completed postsecondary education). 
Information on education levels is captured by dummy variables. In the regression analyses, 
secondary education is the omitted category.  
Part time employment: In the occupations category, the CCEB makes a distinction between full time 
and part time or occasional work. Our part time employment dummy reflects the latter two 
with value one.  
Black economy activity: The CCEB has asked for the main source of the individual’s income. Our 
black economy dummy is positive if the individual has indicated black economy activities. 
Public employment: The CCEB contains information on whether the individual has received his pay 
from a public authority. This is reflected by our public employment dummy with value one.  
Settlement: In the survey, three types of settlement are distinguished: Rural area, small town, and 
large town. We make use of these categories.  
Country: The CCEB contains information on the country of residence of the individual. We create 
dummies to distinguish the twelve EU accession countries (as of 2003). Of these countries, 
only citizens were surveyed. 
EU language: The individuals participating in the CCEB survey were asked about their conversation 
level proficiency of a list of languages. Among these, we distinguish the official languages of 
those EU-15 countries which the respective interviewee has visited for any reason in the past 
two years, and of those where no such visit has taken place. 
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Table 1   Data summary, by work status  Table 2   Data summary, by migration status 
Variable
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
age 19.3196 (0.0469) 22.1035 (0.1833) 2.7839
***
couple 0.0545 (0.2271) 0.1724 (0.3790) 0.1179 ***
experience 4.0966 (2.3935) 5.0828 (2.5780) 0.9862 ***
education: primary 0.5117 (0.4999) 0.1793 (0.3849) -0.3324 ***
education: secondary 0.4588 (0.4984) 0.7448 (0.4375) 0.2860 ***
education: tertiary 0.0296 (0.1694) 0.0759 (0.2657) 0.0463 ***
settlement: rural 0.3481 (0.4764) 0.3241 (0.4697) -0.0240
settlement: small town 0.3513 (0.4775) 0.3586 (0.4813) 0.0073
settlement: large town 0.3006 (0.4586) 0.3172 (0.4670) 0.0166
Bulgaria 0.1272 (0.3333) 0.1172 (0.3228) -0.0100
Cyprus 0.0461 (0.2098) 0.0207 (0.1428) -0.0254 *
Czech R. 0.0564 (0.2308) 0.0207 (0.1428) -0.0357 **
Estonia 0.0941 (0.2921) 0.1724 (0.3790) 0.0783 ***
Hungary 0.1001 (0.3002) 0.0828 (0.2765) -0.0173
Latvia 0.0928 (0.2902) 0.0621 (0.2421) -0.0307
Lithuania 0.0982 (0.2976) 0.1379 (0.3460) 0.0397 *
Malta 0.0431 (0.2032) 0.0552 (0.2291) 0.0121
Poland 0.0922 (0.2894) 0.0897 (0.2867) -0.0025
Romania 0.0686 (0.2529) 0.0552 (0.2291) -0.0134
Slovakia 0.0928 (0.2902) 0.0828 (0.2765) -0.0100
Slovenia 0.0882 (0.2836) 0.1034 (0.3056) 0.0152
observations
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% resp. (one-sided test of equal means).






mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
age 18.4435 (0.0516) 21.1681 (0.0693) 2.7246 ***
couple 0.0257 (0.1583) 0.1181 (0.3229) 0.0924 ***
experience 3.8095 (2.3213) 4.7101 (2.4513) 0.9006 ***
education: primary 0.6116 (0.4875) 0.2993 (0.4581) -0.3123 ***
education: secondary 0.3688 (0.4826) 0.6486 (0.4776) 0.2798 ***
education: tertiary 0.0196 (0.1386) 0.0522 (0.2225) 0.0326 ***
settlement: rural 0.3431 (0.4748) 0.3543 (0.4785) 0.0112
settlement: small town 0.3635 (0.4811) 0.3304 (0.4705) -0.0331 **
settlement: large town 0.2933 (0.4554) 0.3152 (0.4648) 0.0219 *
Bulgaria 0.1346 (0.3414) 0.113 (0.3168) -0.0216 **
Cyprus 0.0477 (0.2132) 0.0406 (0.1974) -0.0071
Czech R. 0.0506 (0.2192) 0.063 (0.2431) 0.0124 *
Estonia 0.0996 (0.2995) 0.0928 (0.2902) -0.0068
Hungary 0.093 (0.2905) 0.1109 (0.3141) 0.0179 *
Latvia 0.0812 (0.2732) 0.1101 (0.3132) 0.0289 ***
Lithuania 0.1155 (0.3196) 0.0717 (0.2581) -0.0438 ***
Malta 0.0363 (0.1871) 0.0565 (0.2310) 0.0202 ***
Poland 0.1134 (0.3172) 0.0543 (0.2268) -0.0591 ***
Romania 0.0661 (0.2485) 0.0717 (0.2581) 0.0056
Slovakia 0.0849 (0.2787) 0.1058 (0.3077) 0.0209 **
Slovenia 0.0771 (0.2668) 0.1094 (0.3123) 0.0323 ***
observations
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% resp. (one-sided test of equal means).








  30Table 3   Data summary, by migration status, working subsample 
Variable
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
income, € 219.14 (256.91) 345.41 (331.19) 126.27 ***
couple 0.1127 (0.3164) 0.2151 (0.4131) 0.1024 ***
experience 4.6916 (2.4699) 4.8065 (2.2470) 0.1149
education: primary 0.3035 (0.4600) 0.1828 (0.3886) -0.1207
***
education: secondary 0.6457 (0.4785) 0.7312 (0.4457) 0.0855
**
education: tertiary 0.0507 (0.2195) 0.0860 (0.2819) 0.0353
*
temporary job 0.4726 (0.4995) 0.3333 (0.4740) -0.1393
***
black market activity 0.0717 (0.2580) 0.0860 (0.2819) 0.0143
public employer 0.2456 (0.4306) 0.1828 (0.3886) -0.0628
occupation: manual 0.3398 (0.4738) 0.3871 (0.4897) 0.0473
occupation: white collar 0.0950 (0.2933) 0.1290 (0.3371) 0.0340
occupation: manager 0.0523 (0.2228) 0.1075 (0.3115) 0.0552
**
occupation: self employed 0.0378 (0.1909) 0.0860 (0.2819) 0.0482
**
occupation: unspecified 0.4750 (0.4996) 0.2903 (0.4564) -0.1847
settlement: rural 0.3583 (0.4797) 0.3548 (0.4811) -0.0035
settlement: small town 0.3285 (0.4699) 0.3226 (0.4700) -0.0059
settlement: large town 0.3132 (0.4640) 0.3226 (0.4700) 0.0094
Bulgaria 0.1119 (0.3154) 0.1398 (0.3486) 0.0279
Cyprus 0.0427 (0.2022) 0.0323 (0.1776) -0.0104
Czech R. 0.0676 (0.2512) 0.0215 (0.1458) -0.0461
Estonia 0.0886 (0.2842) 0.1828 (0.3886) 0.0942
Hungary 0.1151 (0.3193) 0.0968 (0.2973) -0.0183
Latvia 0.1103 (0.3134) 0.0753 (0.2653) -0.0350
Lithuania 0.0628 (0.2427) 0.1075 (0.3115) 0.0447
Malta 0.0572 (0.2323) 0.0753 (0.2653) 0.0181
Poland 0.0539 (0.2260) 0.0645 (0.2470) 0.0106
Romania 0.0692 (0.2540) 0.0430 (0.2040) -0.0262
Slovakia 0.1071 (0.3093) 0.0753 (0.2653) -0.0318
Slovenia 0.1135 (0.3174) 0.0860 (0.2819) -0.0275
observations
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% resp. (one-sided test of equal means).
mean diff.
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Table 4   Visits to Western Europe: Source and destination 
     countries  
 
From/to:
BE DK GE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT SF SE UK CH LI NW SUM
B G 204500010010002000 1 3
C Y 010301020200011000 3
C Z 002001010200011100 2
E E 136001001200 1 3 40000 1 7
H U 116111121281001200 9
L V 114011200201221002 7
L T 115002010110031000 1 0
M T 212122152211212101 7
P L 015011030100010000 6
R O 002000010000000100 4
S K 005001010050001000 7
S I 103012040160001100 8
S U M 9 94 4 1 061 342 141 5 2 231 7 1 3 1 16 0 3 9 3
 
  31Table 5  OLS estimation results: stayers’ and movers’ earnings, mean difference estimator 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
migrant 0.2476
*** (0.0695) 0.2018
*** (0.0708) 0.2004 ** (0.0892) 0.1248 (0.0973)
W.eur. language 1 0.2202
** (0.0895)
W.eur. language 2 0.0444 (0.0478)
part-time job -0.3229
*** (0.0633) -0.3318
*** (0.0639) -0.3312 *** (0.0633) -0.3322 *** (0.0673)
black economy 0.1653
* (0.0898) 0.1770
* (0.0908) 0.1669 * (0.0891) 0.2075 ** (0.0959)
public employer 0.0574 (0.0451) 0.0579 (0.0454) 0.0452 (0.0449) 0.0696 (0.0472)
education: primary -0.2824
*** (0.0720) -0.2577
*** (0.0733) -0.2833 *** (0.0721) -0.2461 *** (0.0747)
education: tertiary 0.2168
*** (0.0819) 0.2048
** (0.0818) 0.2209 *** (0.0830) 0.1928 ** (0.0904)
occupation: manual 0.7915
*** (0.0632) 0.7975
*** (0.0635) 0.7871 *** (0.0633) 0.8168 *** (0.0673)
white collar 0.8064
*** (0.0789) 0.8020
*** (0.0787) 0.8091 *** (0.0790) 0.8074 *** (0.0824)
manager 0.8833
*** (0.0797) 0.8831
*** (0.0792) 0.8858 *** (0.0798) 0.9344 *** (0.0845)
self-employed 1.0113
*** (0.1136) 1.0015
*** (0.1112) 1.0214 *** (0.1130) 1.0276 *** (0.1268)
location: rural area 0.0043 (0.0480) 0.0074 (0.0479) 0.0029 (0.0479) -0.0049 (0.0496)
location: large town 0.1544
*** (0.0490) 0.1443
*** (0.0498) 0.1535 *** (0.0493) 0.1630 *** (0.0521)
Bulgaria -0.8214 *** (0.1026) -0.8032
*** (0.1030) -0.8242 *** (0.1041) -0.7747 *** (0.1044)
Cyprus 1.3477 *** (0.1200) 1.3435
*** (0.1197) 1.3470 *** (0.1209) 1.4288 *** (0.1217)
Czech R. -0.3190 ** (0.1392) -0.3463
** (0.1401) -0.3354 ** (0.1401) -0.2928 ** (0.1420)
Estonia -0.1975 (0.1221) -0.2113
* (0.1232) -0.1888 (0.1233) -0.1575 (0.1279)
Hungary 0.0703 (0.1094) 0.0523 (0.1094) 0.0563 (0.1108) 0.0807 (0.1120)
Latvia -0.2615 ** (0.1173) -0.2701
** (0.1169) -0.2817 ** (0.1190) -0.2636 ** (0.1206)
Lithuania -0.1796 (0.1148) -0.1732 (0.1147) -0.1959 * (0.1180) -0.1880 (0.1196)
Malta 1.0461 *** (0.1183) 1.0134
*** (0.1210) 1.0478 *** (0.1194) 1.0729 *** (0.1208)
Romania -1.1943 *** (0.1326) -1.1828
*** (0.1342) -1.2136 *** (0.1338) -1.1767 *** (0.1366)
Slovakia -0.4426 *** (0.1106) -0.4619 *** (0.1109) -0.4678 *** (0.1121) -0.4294 *** (0.1143)
Slovenia 0.7639 *** (0.1113) 0.7384
*** (0.1126) 0.7595 *** (0.1133) 0.8089 *** (0.1153)
constant 5.1564 *** (0.1530) 5.1530
*** (0.1533) 5.1928 *** (0.1548) 5.1522 *** (0.1616)
lambda (L) -0.5526
*** (0.0970) -0.5856
*** (0.0980) -0.5655 *** (0.0973) -0.5961 *** (0.1021)
observations
R²
Specifications: (A) Western European working experience; (B) Western European working experience, language skills considered; (C) Eastern European working 
experience; (D) Eastern European working experience, Western experience dropped.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% resp. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All explana-tory variables are binary. Omitted categories: no foreign work experience, full time job, emploment in formal economy, employer in private 
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Table 6   Probit estimation results: selection equations  
 
Dependent variables: 
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
couple 0.8506 *** (0.0973) 0.1585 (0.1285) 0.8495 *** (0.0973) 0.1958 (0.1292) 0.3850 *** (0.1050) 0.1345 (0.1291)
age 0.1470 *** (0.0198) 0.1310 *** (0.0212) 0.3327 *** (0.0155) 0.1809 *** (0.0230)
experience 0.1808 *** (0.0343) 0.1796 *** (0.0344) -0.0111 (0.0370) -0.0223 (0.0648)
experience squared -0.0143 *** (0.0033) -0.0142 *** (0.0033) -0.0149 *** (0.0034) -0.0026 (0.0058)
education: primary -0.7806 *** (0.0514) -0.2626 ** (0.1149) -0.7802 *** (0.0514) -0.3234 *** (0.1158) 0.0336 (0.0632) -0.2080 * (0.1181)
education: tertiary 0.2660 ** (0.1298) -0.1004 (0.1763) 0.2654 ** (0.1299) -0.0768 (0.1762) -0.3917 *** (0.1492) -0.2078 (0.1874)
settlement: rural 0.0924 * (0.0529) -0.0416 (0.0967) 0.0919 * (0.0529) -0.0359 (0.0968) 0.0480 (0.0560) -0.0389 (0.0967)
settlement: large town 0.0825 (0.0561) -0.1177 (0.1006) 0.0818 (0.0561) -0.1102 (0.1007) 0.0954 (0.0592) -0.0922 (0.1010)
Bulgaria 0.3542 *** (0.1037) -0.0918 (0.1763) 0.3527 *** (0.1036) -0.0902 (0.1761) 0.3069 *** (0.1119) -0.0927 (0.1758)
Cyprus 0.1124 (0.1331) -0.3085 (0.2861) 0.1110 (0.1331) -0.3717 (0.2844) 0.7447 *** (0.1422) -0.2941 (0.2871)
Czech Republic 0.8506 *** (0.1205) -0.2722 (0.2886) 0.8487 *** (0.1204) -0.2739 (0.2882) 0.9927 *** (0.1321) -0.2731 (0.2895)
Estonia 0.5187 *** (0.1094) 0.4005 ** (0.1735) 0.5190 *** (0.1093) 0.3959 ** (0.1737) 0.7030 *** (0.1161) 0.4231 ** (0.1742)
Hungary 0.6264 *** (0.1066) -0.1149 (0.1924) 0.6243 *** (0.1065) -0.1160 (0.1921) 0.6991 *** (0.1144) -0.0980 (0.1931)
Latvia 0.6675 *** (0.1087) -0.2030 (0.2025) 0.6668 *** (0.1086) -0.2121 (0.2027) 0.8639 *** (0.1141) -0.1806 (0.2040)
Lithuania 0.153 (0.1111) 0.1670 (0.1792) 0.1517 (0.1110) 0.1623 (0.1797) 0.2088 * (0.1205) 0.1782 (0.1796)
Malta 0.6653 *** (0.1393) 0.1491 (0.2289) 0.6645 *** (0.1393) 0.1324 (0.2268) 0.9788 *** (0.1363) 0.1706 (0.2287)
Romania 0.1416 (0.1176) -0.2731 (0.2146) 0.1394 (0.1175) -0.2829 (0.2140) 0.5592 *** (0.1322) -0.2147 (0.2141)
Slovakia 0.6282 *** (0.1073) -0.1079 (0.1952) 0.6264 *** (0.1071) -0.1023 (0.1949) 0.7213 *** (0.1169) -0.0930 (0.1963)
Slovenia 0.6241 *** (0.1102) -0.0955 *** (0.1897) 0.6207 *** (0.1101) -0.0777 (0.1889) 0.8280 *** (0.1172) 0.0035 (0.1913)




***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables except age, experience and experience squared are binary. Omitted categories are: Completed 
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 Table 7   OLS estimation results: stayers’ earnings, various selection correction terms 
 
Dependent variable: 



















































settlement: rural 0.0220 (0.0499) -0.0096 (0.0498) 0.0387 (0.0502) 0.0389 (0.0504) -0.0063 (0.0488)


















Czech R. 0.0358 (0.1364) -0.2853
** (0.1416) 0.0330 (0.1523) 0.0972 (0.1552) -0.3447
** (0.1562)
Estonia 0.0489 (0.1265) -0.1563 (0.1278) -0.1808 (0.1260) -0.1829 (0.1255) -0.1058 (0.1251)
Hungary 0.3240
*** (0.1104) 0.0848 (0.1120) 0.3077
*** (0.1176) 0.3540
*** (0.1194) 0.0605 (0.1200)
Latvia 0.0154 (0.1166) -0.2536
** (0.1202) 0.0186 (0.1279) 0.0767 (0.1305) -0.3336
** (0.1378)
Lithuania -0.0929 (0.1201) -0.1816 (0.1191) -0.2103
* (0.1178) -0.2135
* (0.1176) -0.1077 (0.1196)











Slovakia -0.1761 (0.1118) -0.4119
*** (0.1138) -0.1976
* (0.1178) -0.1522 (0.1193) -0.4397
*** (0.1211)










lambda - L=1 -0.5949 *** (0.1027) -0.2281
* (0.1262) -0.2224
* (0.1222)
lambda - M=0 -2.1721 *** (0.3947) 2.3352
*** (0.3916)
lambda 1 - L=1, M=0 -0.7729 *** (0.1201)
lambda 2 - L=1, M=0 -0.7056 (0.5428)
observations
R² 0.64 0.65 0.66
(2) (3) 
0.67
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are binary. Omitted categories are: full-time job, formal 
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  34Table 8   OLS estimation results: movers’ earnings, various selection correction terms 
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
part-time job -0.4485 ** (0.1911) -0.4501 ** (0.1930) -0.4423 ** (0.1906) -0.4415 ** (0.1909) -0.4357 ** (0.2001)
black economy -0.0353 (0.1979) -0.0356 (0.1994) -0.0361 (0.1853) -0.0362 (0.1850) -0.0330 (0.1902)
public employer -0.1555 (0.1752) -0.1554 (0.1764) -0.2117 (0.1790) -0.2107 (0.1784) -0.1977 (0.1825)
education: primary -0.6617 ** (0.2626) -0.6758 ** (0.3152) -0.6192 * (0.3309) -0.6033 * (0.3347) -0.5261 * (0.3289)
education: tertiary 0.4050 * (0.2207) 0.4053 * (0.2229) 0.3732 (0.2234) 0.3714 (0.2235) 0.3708 (0.2150)
occupation: manual 0.3645 * (0.2036) 0.3627 * (0.2032) 0.3297 (0.1995) 0.3306 (0.2001) 0.3423 (0.2201)
occupation: white collar 0.7154 ** (0.2812) 0.7147 ** (0.2840) 0.6433 ** (0.2824) 0.6428 ** (0.2832) 0.6632 ** (0.2937)
occupation: manager 0.5038 * (0.2824) 0.5065 * (0.2918) 0.4566 (0.2924) 0.4556 (0.2929) 0.4470 (0.3044)
occupation: self employed 0.8079 *** (0.2085) 0.8085 *** (0.2113) 0.7537 *** (0.2178) 0.7534 *** (0.2182) 0.7571 *** (0.2386)
settlement: rural 0.2946 (0.1771) 0.2948 (0.1780) 0.2929 (0.1758) 0.2962 * (0.1758) 0.2988 * (0.1790)
settlement: large town 0.1255 (0.1529) 0.1242 (0.1564) 0.1866 (0.1483) 0.1920 (0.1487) 0.1888 (0.1545)
Bulgaria -1.1844 *** (0.4226) -1.1736 *** (0.4288) -1.1245 ** (0.4379) -1.1078 ** (0.4405) -1.1818 ** (0.5244)
Cyprus 0.3922 (0.5450) 0.3917 (0.5497) 0.6155 (0.5383) 0.6597 (0.5468) 0.6147 (0.7631)
Czech R. -1.1071 ** (0.5370) -1.0925 * (0.5624) -0.8261 (0.5715) -0.7834 (0.5771) -0.9193 (0.8927)
Estonia -0.3628 (0.3963) -0.3477 (0.4461) -0.3814 (0.4522) -0.3804 (0.4551) -0.4645 (0.4430)
Hungary -0.0601 (0.5049) -0.0512 (0.5176) 0.08 (0.5465) 0.1044 (0.5532) 0.032 (0.6617)
Latvia -0.071 (0.4129) -0.0555 (0.4628) 0.128 (0.4855) 0.1591 (0.4896) 0.0451 (0.7147)
Lithuania -0.2249 (0.4062) -0.2182 (0.4110) -0.2699 (0.4152) -0.2704 (0.4153) -0.2953 (0.4246)
Malta 0.9194 * (0.4703) 0.9318 * (0.4975) 1.0144 ** (0.4876) 1.0356 ** (0.4897) 0.9442 (0.5855)
Romania -1.4293 *** (0.4176) -1.4263 *** (0.4199) -1.2851 *** (0.4519) -1.2616 *** (0.4562) -1.3063 ** (0.6453)
Slovakia -0.5772 (0.4092) -0.5664 (0.4263) -0.4069 (0.4434) -0.385 (0.4481) -0.4793 (0.6387)
Slovenia 0.5235 (0.4560) 0.5345 (0.4723) 0.6979 (0.4828) 0.7171 (0.4867) 0.606 (0.5597)
constant 5.4384 *** (0.4429) 5.4113 *** (0.5493) 5.9609 *** (0.6873) 5.9935 *** (0.7213) 6.0629 *** (0.8999)
lambda - L=1 0.0262 (0.3372) 0.2172 (0.3632) 0.2531 (0.3727)
lambda - M=1 -0.4037 (0.2621) -0.4515 (0.2958)
lambda 1 - M=1, L=1 0.0684 (0.8023)





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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m employ ent, employer in private sector, completed secondary education, occupation unspecified, living in small town, country: Poland. Hausman test - H0: The difference between the 
coefficients of the stayers' and the movers' equation is not systematic (country dummies, the constant, and selection correction terms not included).
 
  35Table 9   Interpretation of the coefficients: Western European working experience 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
stayers movers
part-time job -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.35
black economy 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
public employer 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.14 -0.14 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18
education: primary -0.44 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 -0.30 -0.48 -0.49 -0.46 -0.45 -0.41
education: tertiary 0.30 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.45
occupation: manual 1.35 1.27 1.18 1.19 0.76 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.41
occupation: white collar 1.33 1.24 1.10 1.11 0.66 1.05 1.04 0.90 0.90 0.94
occupation: manager 1.59 1.55 1.26 1.27 0.86 0.65 0.66 0.58 0.58 0.56
occupation: self employed 1.96 1.81 1.58 1.61 1.11 1.24 1.24 1.12 1.12 1.13
settlement: rural 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35
settlement: large town 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.21
Bulgaria -0.46 -0.54 -0.48 -0.46 -0.54 -0.69 -0.69 -0.68 -0.67 -0.69
Cyprus 3.27 3.15 4.05 4.42 2.53 0.48 0.48 0.85 0.93 0.85
Czech R. 0.04 -0.25 0.03 0.10 -0.29 -0.67 -0.66 -0.56 -0.54 -0.60
Estonia 0.05 -0.14 -0.17 -0.17 -0.10 -0.30 -0.29 -0.32 -0.32 -0.37
Hungary 0.38 0.09 0.36 0.42 0.06 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.11 0.03
Latvia 0.02 -0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.28 -0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.17 0.05
Lithuania -0.09 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.10 -0.20 -0.20 -0.24 -0.24 -0.26
Malta 2.68 1.90 2.40 2.53 1.77 1.51 1.54 1.76 1.82 1.57
Romania -0.67 -0.69 -0.62 -0.60 -0.71 -0.76 -0.76 -0.72 -0.72 -0.73
Slovakia -0.16 -0.34 -0.18 -0.14 -0.36 -0.44 -0.43 -0.33 -0.32 -0.38
Slovenia 1.86 1.26 1.70 1.79 1.09 0.69 0.71 1.01 1.05 0.83
constant 86.62 170.84 79.26 70.97 245.94 230.07 223.92 387.96 400.82 429.62
The figure for the constant - the exponential of the estimated coefficient - indicates the estimated income of a person with characteristics described by the omitted 
categories in € . The figures for the dummy variables indicate the ratio of income against the omitted category. Bold figures relate to significant coefficients at 10 per 
cent or less.
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Table 10  OLS estimation results: stayers’ earnings, various selection correction terms, language skills considered 
 
Dependent variable: 
log income, € coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coe
eu language, visited 0.1985 * (0.1024) 0.2213 ** (0.1019) 0.2359 ** (0.1015) 0.2383 ** (0.1015) 0.2753
eu language, other 0.0389 (0.0499) 0.0543 (0.0493) 0.0719 (0.0486) 0.0731 (0.0484) 0.0923
part-time job -0.3304 *** (0.0686) -0.3369 *** (0.0677) -0.3115 *** (0.0676) -0.3089 *** (0.0675) -0.3059
black economy 0.2159 ** (0.0982) 0.2185 ** (0.0973) 0.2134 ** (0.0948) 0.2162 ** (0.0944) 0.2355
public employer 0.0898 * (0.0474) 0.0762 (0.0475) 0.0768 (0.0471) 0.0758 (0.0470) 0.0703
education: primary -0.5717 *** (0.0533) -0.2246 *** (0.0759) -0.2371 *** (0.0756) -0.2114 *** (0.0748) -0.3392
education: tertiary 0.2522 *** (0.0882) 0.1801 ** (0.0899) 0.1858 ** (0.0909) 0.1826 ** (0.0911) 0.2149
occupation: manual 0.8604 *** (0.0675) 0.8292 *** (0.0674) 0.7908 *** (0.0666) 0.7850 *** (0.0666) 0.5757
occupation: white collar 0.8366 *** (0.0833) 0.7989 *** (0.0823) 0.7327 *** (0.0827) 0.7261 *** (0.0827) 0.4950
occupation: manager 0.9490 *** (0.0823) 0.9318 *** (0.0835) 0.8135 *** (0.0844) 0.8014 *** (0.0846) 0.6042
occupation: self employed 1.0779 *** (0.1304) 1.0222 *** (0.1237) 0.9391 *** (0.1261) 0.9292 *** (0.1263) 0.7268
settlement: rural 0.0282 (0.0500) -0.0049 (0.0497) 0.0448 (0.0501) 0.0499 (0.0500) 0.0028
settlement: large town 0.1835 *** (0.0530) 0.1487 *** (0.0529) 0.2254 *** (0.0548) 0.2350 *** (0.0549) 0.1421
Bulgaria -0.5887 *** (0.1082) -0.7546 *** (0.1058) -0.6152 *** (0.1051) -0.5842 *** (0.1055) -0.7277
Cyprus 1.4474 *** (0.1258) 1.4127 *** (0.1223) 1.6089 *** (0.1229) 1.6795 *** (0.1255) 1.2363
Czech R. 0.0276 (0.1367) -0.3107 ** (0.1424) 0.0135 (0.1528) 0.0787 (0.1556) -0.3659
Estonia 0.0448 (0.1279) -0.1728 (0.1295) -0.1989 (0.1278) -0.2011 (0.1272) -0.1237
Hungary 0.3177 *** (0.1102) 0.0643 (0.1120) 0.2903 ** (0.1173) 0.3373 *** (0.1190) 0.0429
Latvia 0.0209 (0.1167) -0.2636 ** (0.1202) 0.0117 (0.1275) 0.0707 (0.1300) -0.3417
Lithuania -0.0804 (0.1205) -0.1728 (0.1193) -0.2008 * (0.1181) -0.2037 * (0.1178) -0.0876
Malta 1.2815 *** (0.1222) 1.0229 *** (0.1248) 1.1766 *** (0.1219) 1.2154 *** (0.1224) 0.9643
Romania -1.0888 *** (0.1440) -1.1495 *** (0.1393) -0.9491 *** (0.1394) -0.9019 *** (0.1406) -1.2067
Slovakia -0.1835 (0.1121) -0.4346 *** (0.1145) -0.2191 * (0.1184) -0.1732 (0.1198) -0.4632
Slovenia 1.0352 *** (0.1157) 0.7852 *** (0.1165) 0.9596 *** (0.1187) 0.9919 *** (0.1194) 0.6929
constant 4.4277 *** (0.1209) 5.1337 *** (0.1610) 4.3413 *** (0.2132) 4.2280 *** (0.2183) 5.4694
lambda - L=1 -0.6282 *** (0.1034) -0.2563 ** (0.1269) -0.2501 ** (0.1228)
lambda - M=0 -2.2042 *** (0.3926) 2.3713 *** (0.3891)
lambda 1 - L=1, M=0 -0.8023




























 - L=1, M -0.7358 (0.5412)
ns
R² 0.67
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are binary. Omitted categories are: full-time job, formal 
employment, employer in private sector, completed secondary education, occupation unspecified, living in small town, country: Poland. 




observatio 1235 1235 1235Table 11  OLS estimation results: movers’ earnings, various selection correction terms, language skills considered 
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
eu language, visited 0.2139 (0.2205) 0.2125 (0.2158) 0.2174 (0.2175) 0.2159 (0.2168) 0.2298 (0.2273)
eu language, other -0.0710 (0.1959) -0.0723 (0.1916) -0.0604 (0.1964) -0.0619 (0.1958) -0.0527 (0.2065)
part-time job -0.4755 ** (0.1914) -0.4763 ** (0.1920) -0.4669 ** (0.1904) -0.4656 ** (0.1908) -0.4666 ** (0.2024)
black economy 0.0266 (0.2146) 0.0259 (0.2148) 0.0282 (0.2078) 0.0274 (0.2070) 0.0333 (0.2163)
public employer -0.2068 (0.1757) -0.2067 (0.1766) -0.2599 (0.1819) -0.2591 (0.1811) -0.2519 (0.1855)
education: primary -0.5731 ** (0.2692) -0.5797 * (0.3195) -0.5245 (0.3349) -0.5145 (0.3389) -0.4292 (0.3375)
education: tertiary 0.3843 (0.2481) 0.3845 (0.2498) 0.3537 (0.2503) 0.3517 (0.2508) 0.3601 (0.2441)
occupation: manual 0.3349 (0.2058) 0.3341 (0.2053) 0.3035 (0.2001) 0.3040 (0.2005) 0.3219 (0.2180)
occupation: white collar 0.7242 *** (0.2668) 0.7235 *** (0.2677) 0.6576 ** (0.2641) 0.6555 ** (0.2643) 0.6849 ** (0.2756)
occupation: manager 0.5517 * (0.2827) 0.5528 * (0.2929) 0.5042 * (0.2951) 0.5033 * (0.2959) 0.5023 (0.3053)
occupation: self employed 0.8093 *** (0.2058) 0.8095 *** (0.2088) 0.7574 *** (0.2131) 0.7570 *** (0.2133) 0.7736 *** (0.2340)
settlement: rural 0.2602 (0.1754) 0.2603 (0.1759) 0.2589 (0.1740) 0.2625 (0.1736) 0.2662 (0.1762)
settlement: large town 0.1417 (0.1515) 0.1412 (0.1550) 0.1993 (0.1462) 0.2062 (0.1460) 0.2058 (0.1493)
Bulgaria -1.2311 *** (0.4093) -1.2267 *** (0.4201) -1.1765 *** (0.4322) -1.1618 *** (0.4349) -1.1735 *** (0.4829)
Cyprus 0.3511 (0.5252) 0.3505 (0.5290) 0.5679 (0.5192) 0.6096 (0.5282) 0.6486 (0.7140)
Czech R. -1.2132 ** (0.5194) -1.2064 ** (0.5490) -0.9534 * (0.5648) -0.9132 (0.5707) -0.9210 (0.8401)
Estonia -0.3274 (0.3717) -0.3208 (0.4339) -0.3539 (0.4406) -0.3543 (0.4436) -0.4025 (0.4067)
Hungary -0.0466 (0.4956) -0.0429 (0.5098) 0.0835 (0.5400) 0.1057 (0.5467) 0.1108 (0.6170)
Latvia -0.1057 (0.4028) -0.0991 (0.4621) 0.0780 (0.4897) 0.1064 (0.4941) 0.1008 (0.6543)
Lithuania -0.2214 (0.3903) -0.2185 (0.4006) -0.2679 (0.4033) -0.2689 (0.4033) -0.2760 (0.4002)
Malta 0.9169 ** (0.4409) 0.9224 * (0.4734) 1.0003 ** (0.4672) 1.0197 ** (0.4698) 1.0047 * (0.5260)
Romania -1.4879 *** (0.4035) -1.4871 *** (0.4077) -1.3473 *** (0.4383) -1.3257 *** (0.4435) -1.2882 ** (0.5968)
Slovakia -0.5991 (0.4008) -0.5946 (0.4231) -0.4402 (0.4447) -0.4204 (0.4498) -0.4236 (0.5928)
Slovenia 0.5403 (0.4322) 0.5451 (0.4519) 0.7001 (0.4673) 0.7176 (0.4715) 0.6771 (0.5074)
constant 5.4434 *** (0.4586) 5.4327 *** (0.5841) 5.9496 *** (0.7021) 5.9857 *** (0.7362) 6.1251 *** (0.9272)
lambda - L=1 0.0118 (0.3418) 0.1909 (0.3630) 0.2076 (0.4043)
lambda - M=1 -0.3855 (0.2600) -0.4172 (0.2837)
lambda 1 - M=1, L=1 0.1983 (0.7795)






***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are binary. Omitted categories are: full-time job, formal 
employment, employer in private sector, completed secondary education, occupation unspecified, living in small town, country: Poland. Hausman test - H0: The difference between the 
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(5) (1) (2) (3) (4)
coefficients of the stayers' and the movers' equation is not systematic (country dummies, the constant, and selection correction terms not included).




(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
couple 0.8506 *** (0.0973) 0.0400 (0.1472) 0.8495 *** (0.0972) 0.0870 (0.1465) 0.3859 *** (0.1049) 0.0327 (0.1462)
age 0.1364 *** (0.0205) 0.1184 *** (0.0205) 0.3325 *** (0.0155) 0.1523 *** (0.0254)
experience 0.1808 *** (0.0343) 0.1787 *** (0.0343) -0.0109 (0.0370) 0.0460 (0.0819)
experience squared -0.0143 *** (0.0033) -0.0141 *** (0.0033) -0.0149 *** (0.0034) -0.0066 (0.0071)
education: primary -0.7806 *** (0.0514) 0.0023 (0.1208) -0.7805 *** (0.0513) -0.0542 (0.1201) 0.0335 (0.0631) 0.0359 (0.1248)
education: tertiary 0.2660 ** (0.1298) -0.1674 (0.2195) 0.2648 ** (0.1296) -0.1451 (0.2196) -0.3968 *** (0.1484) -0.1814 (0.2363)
settlement: rural 0.0924 * (0.0529) -0.0637 (0.1048) 0.0924 * (0.0529) -0.0594 (0.1047) 0.0481 (0.0560) -0.0639 (0.1047)
settlement: large town 0.0825 (0.0561) -0.1798 * (0.1093) 0.0825 (0.0561) -0.1714 (0.1091) 0.0947 (0.0592) -0.1634 (0.1090)
Bulgaria 0.3542 *** (0.1037) 0.0793 (0.2298) 0.3528 *** (0.1036) 0.0854 (0.2294) 0.3047 *** (0.1119) 0.0704 (0.2290)
Cyprus 0.1124 (0.1331) 0.1112 (0.1330) -5.0553 *** (0.1862) 0.7431 *** (0.1421) -5.0333 *** (0.1869)
Czech Republic 0.8506 *** (0.1205) 0.0987 (0.3063) 0.8484 *** (0.1204) 0.0967 (0.3050) 0.9899 *** (0.1320) 0.0854 (0.3053)
Estonia 0.5187 *** (0.1094) 0.3988 * (0.2356) 0.5174 *** (0.1091) 0.3963 * (0.2358) 0.6994 *** (0.1159) 0.4083 * (0.2357)
Hungary 0.6264 *** (0.1066) 0.2231 (0.2340) 0.6249 *** (0.1064) 0.2231 (0.2336) 0.6978 *** (0.1143) 0.2365 (0.2347)
Latvia 0.6675 *** (0.1087) 0.5013 ** (0.2265) 0.6668 *** (0.1086) 0.4880 ** (0.2266) 0.8634 *** (0.1139) 0.4940 ** (0.2267)
Lithuania 0.1530 (0.1111) 0.6922 *** (0.2166) 0.1492 (0.1111) 0.6821 *** (0.2165) 0.2037 * (0.1205) 0.6805 *** (0.2159)
Malta 0.6653 *** (0.1393) -0.3742 (0.4118) 0.6651 *** (0.1392) -0.3985 (0.4116) 0.9787 *** (0.1362) -0.4046 (0.4122)
Romania 0.1416 (0.1176) 0.3804 (0.2336) 0.1402 (0.1176) 0.3656 (0.2335) 0.5573 *** (0.1322) 0.4105 * (0.2349)
Slovakia 0.6282 *** (0.1073) 0.6808 *** (0.2123) 0.6279 *** (0.1071) 0.6858 *** (0.2121) 0.7201 *** (0.1168) 0.6793 *** (0.2122)
Slovenia 0.6241 *** (0.1102) -0.5244 (0.3189) 0.6226 *** (0.1101) -0.4962 (0.3188) 0.8271 *** (0.1171) -0.4606 (0.3230)




Separate probit estimations Seemingly unrelated probit Bivariate probit
working; Eastern Eur. work 
experience
P(l=1) P(m=1) P(l=1) P(m=1) P(l=1) P(m=1)
coeff. coeff.
3831 3658 3831 3831
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff.
-2197.07 -451.93 -2645.16 -2374.46
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables except age, experience and experience squared are binary. Omitted categories are: Completed 
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Dependent variable: 
log income, € coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
part-time job -0.3481 *** (0.0680) -0.3501 *** (0.0666) -0.3379 *** (0.0668) -0.3344 *** (0.0662) -0.3183 *** (0.0640)
black economy 0.1517 (0.0949) 0.1572 * (0.0935) 0.1810 * (0.0923) 0.1686 * (0.0916) 0.1804 ** (0.0884)
public employer 0.0568 (0.0465) 0.0460 (0.0465) 0.0191 (0.0478) 0.0317 (0.0464) 0.0392 (0.0449)
education: primary -0.6115 *** (0.0526) -0.2537 *** (0.0739) -0.2918 *** (0.0755) -0.2886 *** (0.0735) -0.3551 *** (0.0534)
education: tertiary 0.2835 *** (0.0859) 0.2123 ** (0.0862) 0.2672 *** (0.0913) 0.2672 *** (0.0871) 0.2328 ** (0.0933)
occupation: manual 0.8019 *** (0.0670) 0.7749 *** (0.0662) 0.7388 *** (0.0657) 0.7189 *** (0.0652) 0.5352 *** (0.0706)
occupation: white collar 0.8018 *** (0.0817) 0.7688 *** (0.0801) 0.7211 *** (0.0822) 0.6962 *** (0.0803) 0.4819 *** (0.0884)
occupation: manager 0.8834 *** (0.0825) 0.8671 *** (0.0824) 0.7788 *** (0.0838) 0.7582 *** (0.0834) 0.5516 *** (0.0887)
occupation: self employed 1.0473 *** (0.1243) 0.9918 *** (0.1169) 0.9000 *** (0.1219) 0.8893 *** (0.1184) 0.7054 *** (0.1192)
settlement: rural 0.0181 (0.0496) -0.0129 (0.0491) 0.0148 (0.0515) 0.0333 (0.0497) 0.0102 (0.0485)
settlement: large town 0.1709 *** (0.0512) 0.1464 *** (0.0507) 0.2402 *** (0.0548) 0.2514 *** (0.0542) 0.1735 *** (0.0538)
Bulgaria -0.6557 *** (0.1063) -0.8362 *** (0.1050) -0.8059 *** (0.1041) -0.8039 *** (0.1034) -0.7840 *** (0.1026)
Cyprus 1.3755 *** (0.1242) 1.3464 *** (0.1210) 1.6058 *** (0.1283) 1.2905 *** (0.1357)
Czech R. -0.0096 (0.1361) -0.3580 ** (0.1413) -0.2271 (0.1427) -0.2066 (0.1418) -0.2925 ** (0.1357)
Estonia 0.0419 (0.1219) -0.1963 (0.1246) -0.2211 * (0.1245) -0.2392 * (0.1239) -0.1581 (0.1191)
Hungary 0.2653 ** (0.1097) 0.0064 (0.1114) 0.0518 (0.1114) 0.0509 (0.1106) 0.0647 (0.1061)
Latvia -0.0124 (0.1172) -0.3094 ** (0.1211) -0.3665 *** (0.1221) -0.3855 *** (0.1218) -0.2839 ** (0.1175)
Lithuania -0.0654 (0.1232) -0.1724 (0.1222) -0.4647 *** (0.1383) -0.5412 *** (0.1430) -0.1393 (0.1471)
Malta 1.2705 *** (0.1173) 1.0072 *** (0.1193) 1.2194 *** (0.1228) 1.2659 *** (0.1240) 1.0422 *** (0.1223)
Romania -1.1747 *** (0.1406) -1.2363 *** (0.1362) -1.3186 *** (0.1368) -1.3505 *** (0.1370) -1.2338 *** (0.1375)
Slovakia -0.2463 ** (0.1117) -0.4992 *** (0.1132) -0.6837 *** (0.1219) -0.7457 *** (0.1239) -0.4591 *** (0.1254)
Slovenia 0.9867 *** (0.1134) 0.7361 *** (0.1138) 0.9387 *** (0.1178) 0.9716 *** (0.1186) 0.7450 *** (0.1226)
constant 4.5784 *** (0.1195) 5.3052 *** (0.1575) 4.8231 *** (0.1823) 4.7779 *** (0.1806) 5.3295 *** (0.1863)
lambda - L=1 -0.6461 *** (0.1002) -0.3822 *** (0.1140) -0.4010 *** (0.1077)
lambda - M=0 -2.5226 *** (0.4730) 2.7641 *** (0.4738)
lambda 1 - L=1, M=0 -0.6590 *** (0.0938)
lambda 2 - L=1, M=0 0.1846 (0.5562)
observations
R² 0.68
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are binary. Omitted categories are: full-time job, formal 
employment, employer in private sector, completed secondary education, occupation unspecified, living in small town, country: Poland. 
0.65 0.66 0.65 0.67
(5)
1266 1266 1210 1266 1266
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
part-time job -0.1863 (0.1864) -0.2360 (0.1687) -0.2339 (0.1711) -0.2341 (0.1701) -0.1823 (0.1888)
black economy 0.2470 (0.2516) 0.2616 (0.2419) 0.1953 (0.2711) 0.1881 (0.2689) 0.2108 (0.2946)
public employer 0.1158 (0.1886) 0.2461 (0.1966) 0.2720 (0.1976) 0.2795 (0.1979) 0.1230 (0.1993)
education: primary -0.0805 (0.2398) -0.8740 ** (0.3596) -0.8488 ** (0.3584) -0.8949 ** (0.3618) -0.0326 (0.2716)
education: tertiary 0.1101 (0.3252) 0.0379 (0.3430) 0.1290 (0.3666) 0.1457 (0.3683) 0.1586 (0.4433)
occupation: manual 0.9514 *** (0.2423) 1.0315 *** (0.2358) 0.9615 *** (0.2622) 0.9615 *** (0.2614) 0.9089 *** (0.2873)
occupation: white collar 1.2115 *** (0.4006) 1.2859 *** (0.3800) 1.2075 *** (0.4157) 1.2102 *** (0.4156) 1.1656 ** (0.4397)
occupation: manager 1.3735 *** (0.3670) 1.4669 *** (0.3739) 1.3568 *** (0.4111) 1.3525 *** (0.4081) 1.3126 *** (0.4436)
occupation: self employed 1.3659 ** (0.5135) 1.5105 *** (0.4419) 1.4483 *** (0.4463) 1.4566 ** (0.4432) 1.3168 ** (0.5498)
settlement: rural 0.0614 (0.2227) 0.1936 (0.2340) 0.2008 (0.2343) 0.2069 (0.2344) 0.0542 (0.2155)
settlement: large town 0.3763 (0.2290) 0.6320 ** (0.2616) 0.6810 ** (0.2818) 0.6986 ** (0.2854) 0.4015 *** (0.3049)
Bulgaria -0.8903 (0.6873) -0.2328 (0.6641) -0.1896 (0.6160) -0.1492 (0.6042) -0.8835 (0.6865)
Cyprus
Czech R. -0.8200 (0.9154) 0.1959 (0.8949) 0.3998 (0.8994) 0.5016 (0.9017) -0.7561 (0.9980)
Estonia -0.4414 (0.7504) 0.2050 (0.7342) 0.1667 (0.7033) 0.2008 (0.6896) -0.4704 (0.7622)
Hungary 0.7125 (0.7298) 1.3960 * (0.7231) 1.4236 * (0.6969) 1.4664 ** (0.6886) 0.7226 (0.7355)
Latvia -0.0486 (0.6985) 0.7290 (0.6819) 0.6530 (0.6363) 0.6866 (0.6250) -0.1017 (0.7014)
Lithuania -0.3789 (0.6782) -0.0053 (0.6302) -0.1608 (0.5885) -0.1791 (0.5813) -0.4595 (0.7613)
Malta 2.8121 *** (0.7214) 3.5881 *** (0.7068) 3.7830 *** (0.6947) 3.8582 *** (0.7000) 2.8965 *** (0.9651)
Romania -0.8616 (0.8110) -0.4129 (0.7554) -0.4284 (0.7195) -0.4080 (0.7071) -0.8727 (0.8282)
Slovakia -0.1223 (0.7191) 0.5238 (0.7203) 0.4366 (0.6983) 0.4571 (0.6925) -0.1714 (0.7440)
Slovenia 0.6184 (0.7549) 1.7112 ** (0.8433) 1.9339 * (0.8700) 1.9454 ** (0.8536) 0.6815 (0.8660)
constant 4.3612 *** (0.6878) 2.6606 *** (0.9259) 3.4764 *** (1.2822) 3.3809 ** (1.3816) 4.8145 *** (1.5834)
lambda - L=1                    1.3003 ** (0.4906) 1.3644 *** (0.4932) 1.5627 *** (0.5540)                    
lambda - M=1                                        -0.4156 (0.4632) -0.3268 (0.5217)                    
lambda 1 - M=1, L=1                                                                                -0.0393 (0.5464)




0.66 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.66
69 69 69 69
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hausman 
Pr>F² 0.1976 0.2775 0.3372 0.28
12.36 13.1 &²
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are binary. Omitted categories are: full-time job, formal 
employment, employer in private sector, completed secondary education, occupation unspecified, living in small town, country: Poland. Hausman test - H0: The difference between the 




  41  42
 




wS m=0 subsample 192.91 193.73 194.59 195.78 195.7797 196.33
m=1 subsample 258.41 256.17 263.38 271.96 271.76 266.24
difference 65.51 62.43 *** 68.79 *** 76.18 *** 75.98 *** 69.91 ***
wM m=0 subsample 247.11 240.43 240.50 237.28 237.37 237.56
m=1 subsample 331.02 313.22 313.23 314.91 314.89 314.40
difference 83.91 72.79 *** 72.73 *** 77.63 *** 77.52 *** 76.84 ***
wM - wS m=0 subsample 54.20
*** 46.70 *** 45.91 *** 41.50 *** 41.59 *** 41.23 ***
m=1 subsample 72.61
*** 57.06 *** 49.85 *** 42.95 *** 43.13 *** 48.16 ***
difference 18.41 *** 10.36 3.94 1.46 1.54 6.93
wM : wS m=0 subsample 1.28 1.38 1.38 1.33 1.34 1.35
m=1 subsample 1.28 1.40 1.36 1.32 1.32 1.30
difference 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
*** denotes significance at 1% (one-sided test of equal means).
(4) (5) mean diff. (1) (2) (3)
     by foreign experience status, from various earnings equation specifications, in €  
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